Arms control begins with transparency

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There is until now no comprehensive, legally binding international law that controls and regulates conventional arms transfers. Most national control instruments contain many loopholes or operate in very deficient ways. Control remains in each government’s hands, and they do not always have the possibility, or the will, to guarantee responsible practices. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) must establish a set of common norms to put an end to the most irresponsible transfers, those that facilitate the carrying out of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

In the face of criticism that the actions suggested by the NGO’s concentrate on legal transfers, and not on the illicit market, it is worth remembering that just about the entire production of arms is manufactured legally, in rich or developing countries (basically the countries of the OECD, which are also the ones endowed with an industrial network). Therefore, we are talking about the countries also most capable of submitting this commerce to a form of control. One cannot avoid noticing that 90% of arms transfers are done legally, which means, with the support of States 1. For this reason, it is fundamental to regulate the legal market in order to avoid having arms falling into the wrong hands.

In this context, one of the features the ATT’s adoption will bring about is a substantial improvement of transparency in conventional arms transfer at the international level. As stated in principle N°5 of the Compilation of Global Principles for Arms Transfers:

“States shall submit comprehensive national annual reports on all their international arms and ammunition transfers to an international registry, which shall publish a compiled, comprehensive, international annual report. Such reports should cover the international transfer of all conventional arms and ammunition including small arms and light weapons.”

The call for transparency does not imply the end or the reduction of the commerce of arms. It only and exclusively suggests putting an end to the political and administrative practice of concealing basic and elementary information about the general characteristics of this commercial activity, based until now on secrecy and confidentiality. Two arguments are usually put forth to justify these procedures: the need to “protect” the identity of the producing firms and individuals, and the fact that transparency would provide information to competitors of other countries interested in competing on the same projects, leading the aforementioned firms to potentially loose numerous and lucrative commercial contracts.

These arguments conceal two big truths. First, that dedicating oneself to the production and commercialization of arms is not an innocent business. To cite but one example, in the same way rigorous controls exist for the production and commercialization of pharmaceutical products, why couldn’t controls be set up for the arms business?

Secondly, it is obvious that large international contracts, especially those involving heavy conventional weapons, the ones of highest economic value, are the object of public bids that entail strong competition between numerous firms of different countries. Specialized magazines (such as Jane’s for example) periodically inform about the state of biddings and which firms were selected or eliminated from the process. Many firms even publicize through their own communication department information on deals being negotiated, in order to highlight the quality of their products or to give the image of a productive and solvent firm on the international market.

Defense magazines, the memoranda many firms hand out in shareholder’s assemblies, economic newspapers, sometimes even general interest newspapers, and several Defense Ministries internet sites frequently offer information on arms transfer, in which firms from other countries compete, or could compete.

This situation leads us to question the real motives behind the secrecy in arms transfers 2. We can offer three hypotheses:

a) the type of product exported;

b) the destination country;

c) a combination of the two.

Some products are extremely sensitive to criticism, in both the exporting and receiving country’s public opinion. For example, anti-personnel mines, cluster bombs or certain police products used in the practice of torture and in violation of human rights. It is not fortuitous that the less transparent sub-sectors are precisely those dedicated to the manufacture of police and security force products, as well as ammunition. Their immediate use in situations of social disturbance converts this category into the one most subject to criticism and condemnation. There are, however, no less innocent categories than the one mentioned. Short guns and other types of military, security or police material can all be used improperly by the security forces of the country of final destination, and result in grave human rights violations such as extrajudicial executions, torture, abuse and homicide of non-combatant civilians. Many manufacturers dedicated to the making of these products shun information about their exports in order to avoid criticism from different sector of public opinion.

Another reason explaining data-concealment comes from the country on the receiving end. If a firm exports, say, cargo transport planes to Nordic countries, it will seldom receive criticism for the sale. The problem, obviously, does not reside in this kind of consumer, but in a long list of countries at war, in tense situations, with important internal conflicts, countries that do not respect the most elementary human rights, or countries with governability problems.

The combination of both factors (a pernicious product for a sensitive country) causes an exporting firm to make sure those sales are secret, since their publicity could entail protests and condemnations that could put the sales themselves at risk.

Transparency can certainly involve the loss or abandon of some transfer projects, but it would precisely be of those hardly justifiable, less recommendable and politically more damaging ones. Their canceling is consequently desirable since it would bring preventive and beneficial effects.

It is thus essential to set up an effective control of this commerce, which will ensure that “certificates of final use” ban their use in the carrying out of human rights violations. The creation of an international registry that compiles all transparencies of arms at the international level (that is, operations of import, export and transit as well as intermediations) will be an invaluable contribution towards the supervision of this type of operation and towards the fight against misappropriation of transfers into unwanted hands.

The ATT should help reach this goal. The current The UN Register of Conventional Arms is an insufficient instrument, with only about 50 countries participating. Furthermore, its information is not always systematic and there is no possibility to contrast it.  To achieve a much more extensive registry, with up-to-date and reliable information, will doubtless be a good faith-generating instrument at world level, a good tool to put arms under control.

1 Keith Krause, Small Arms and Light Weapons: Proliferation Processes and Policy Options, International Security Research and Outbreach Programme, International Security Bureau, July 2000.

2 Fisas, Vicenç: El lobby feroz, Icaria, Barcelone, 1999.