São Paulo faces cutting edge crime with antiquated criminal justice

INTERVIEW / Sérgio Adorno

"Organized crime matured while the institutions responsible for the implementation of law and order became obsolete."  This is the diagnosis of Sergio Adorno, professor of the Department of Sociology and coordinator of the Center for the Study of Violence at the University of São Paulo Núcleo de Estudos da Violência (NEV).

In this exclusive interview given to the Comunidad Segura portal, Adorno states that the main fault of Brazil’s criminal justice system is a fundamental resistance to change and to the introduction of innovative policies.  “The nature and organization of crime in Brazil changed and grew. It uses new technology and information provided word-of-mouth by lawyers and family members.  In response, the state of São Paulo has increased its incarcerated population, following antiquated policy that dates back to the government of conservative Jânio Quadros”, he states.
 

Was the security crisis in São Paulo predictable?

Yes. As in other Brazilian cities, organized crime, especially (but not exclusively) related to the drug traffic, spread rapidly, taking over activities formerly carried out by individual or gang-affiliated delinquents, such as robbery, extortion by means of kidnapping, and the business of providing personal security. This scenario became more complex and increasingly linked to various aspects of organized crime, involving more individuals and innumerous sectors of the market and state apparatus. Given that, in the past fifty years, no responsible policies have been implemented (policies have been implemented, but traditional ones, incapable of dealing with the new problems that have arisen), the situation was indeed predictable.

What allowed for the increase of organized crime both inside and outside of prisons?

The nature and patterns of crime have changed. It has become ‘modern’, taking advantage of new technology such as cell phones, computers, electronic communication, telephone centers and also the circulation of word-of-mouth information provided by lawyers and family members, as reports in both electronic and print media have revealed.  Organized crime is internally linked to both the local market and other sectors of the illegal market on the local, regional, national and international levels.  It operates based on flexible networks permeating various sectors of society, especially the financial sector. Its chain of command responds to orders with speed and precision, regardless of the nature of the operation or those on the receiving end. Organized crime matured while the institutions responsible for the implementation of law and order became obsolete. Moreover the directors of these institutions had neither the audacity nor the courage to brainstorm solutions other than the traditional ones of hunting down criminals and putting them behind bars.

What are the main faults of the public security and criminal justice systems in Brazil, specifically in São Paulo?

The system’s main fault is a tremendous resistance to change and the implementation of innovative policies. The system continues to work as it did practically half a century ago.  The state of São Paulo, recognized as the seat of economic and technological innovation in the country, has responded to an increase in crime rates and a mounting sense of collective insecurity with aggressive policies to increase the incarcerated population, clearly an outdated approach since the policy dates back to the government of conservative Jânio Quadros in the mid-fifties. Despite all the years that have passed, and the fundamental changes that have arisen and continue to surface in society, these policies have remained unchanged.

What were the consequences?  

The consequence is what we have seen: continuous over-population, the expansion of organized crime inside prisons, the increase of prisoners dependent on factions such as the PCC (known as First National Command), the succession of prison rebellions and riots (and the consequent death of  both prisoners and agents), and the destruction of public goods. Perhaps most perplexing is the photo of the naked prisoners on the patio of the Araraquara Penitentiary, locked up by prison agents. This image will never be forgotten, even though it inspired little compassion in the common citizen and the higher state authorities.

How can intelligence and police repression be combined to help combat organized crime?
 

Nowhere in the world will the struggle to control organized crime be an easy task.  There is no simple method that has been proven successful, as organized crime is an international and globalized system, facilitated and strengthened by the deregulation of the economic and financial markets that took place in the 70s and 80s.  It is possible, however, utilizing intelligence and effective information systems, to reduce the fatalities incurred by organized crime.  This is one of the greatest challenges: to achieve the highest protection of the life of all citizens, including the youths, who, one way or another, are recruited into circles of organized crime.

Is the crisis in São Paulo a threat to democracy?

The resolution to this problem ought to be sought within democratic society.  Throughout the crisis in São Paulo, at least since last May, we have witnessed perplexing and often repeated declarations by the authorities that reveal a strong inclination towards the suspension of the state of law and constitutional guarantees, as if these represented obstacles to the effective control of violence and organized crime.  The experience of several western societies—that of the United States during the years of prohibition, for example—has demonstrated that the rise in crime and violence can be faced by reinforcing respect for the law and legal authorities, rather than through the authoritarian inclinations of those in power.

How can we combat organized crime that has legal allies?  Who are these actors and in what ways are they involved?

This is, without a doubt, one of the most relevant issues.  No society that has succeeded in controlling organized crime—the United States and Great Britain are the first examples that come to mind—has ceased to rigorously combat the corruption of agents of law and order.  International literature on the performance of law enforcement agencies has shown definitively that in order to implement institutional reforms in the criminal justice system, it is first necessary to confront issues of corruption within its ranks. This issue has become more complex now with the incredible diversity of actors involved, and the measures they have taken to guarantee privileged access to information, that nest illegal and legal activities together.

What would be an example?

Just look at what goes on in the major cities of Brazil with respect to public transportation and garbage collection, both largely controlled by organized crime.  In reality, this only came about with the help of an extensive network of relationships and actors which stretches all the way from the sidewalks, where street vendors sell pirated goods and under the protection of public officials who chose to turn a blind eye in exchange for cash to the highest realms of the financial market, passing through intermediaries such as liberal professionals, employees of small and medium-sized businesses, authorities, and politicians.  This is not a product of my imagination.  Read the four volumes of the CPI do Narcotráfico (Parliamentary Commission of Investigation into the Drug Trade), which documents a mere fraction of the cases and individuals involved.  It will suffice to understand how this network corrodes the faith of citizens in their institutions, affecting the legitimacy of democratic life in the country.
 

How can these irregularities be controlled?

By reinforcing and divulging mechanisms designed to ensure accountability, such as the free circulation of information, the CPIs (Parliamentary Committee Investigations), and actions of the Public Ministry.  Punishing those whose legal activities contribute to criminal activities is one of one of those mechanisms. These mechanisms are in place in Brazil, which is a step in the right direction. What is missing, however, is greater integration among the institutions—with the justice system, for example—in order to ensure that punishments (regardless of the nature of the sentence itself, whether it serves to restrict freedoms or deny certain goods) are effective and function as a deterrent to others in the future. In other words, we need to increase the personal cost of crimes of corruption.

Should the restriction of cell phones within prisons be the focus of actions to control organized crime?

No. This is definitely a tactic that should be studied and implemented.  The reasons for this are obvious and require no further explanation. But it’s misleading to believe that prison or public security policies should focus on that aspect. It is like believing that weapon detectors in airports are sufficient to assure flight security.  Flight security has to do with complex engineering, logistical information systems, and risk reduction. You can’t leave the effectiveness of those public security systems in the hands of an x-ray machine.

What leads someone to befriend the PCC and be an accomplice in events such as those which took place in São Paulo in May?

We don’t really know.  Organized crime in São Paulo has not been studied as exhaustively as organized crime has been Rio de Janeiro under the direction of experienced researchers like Alba Zaluar, Michel Misse, Luiz Antônio Machado, Julita Lemgruber, and others.  On one hand, as far as I know, what has driven so many young people outside of prison to participate in organized crime is the perverse mechanism of getting into debt that is associated with buying consumer goods, and the need to sell drugs in order to pay off that debt.* This mechanism is not specific to organized crime.  Modern slavery in the countryside, for example, functions on the same principle.  On the other hand, it’s likely that some youths are drawn to organized crime precisely because of these “ritualized” events of disorganization of our cities.  We live in a society ruled by powerful mechanisms that disqualify ‘the other’, that deny those who live at the margins of the public sphere, their personal identities and dignity. These groups are excluded from the public world, deprived of the ability to see and be seen, to hear and be heard.  The potential victims of this process are the poor, those who live mainly in what we call ‘peripheral’ neighborhoods, where the quality of life in community has been degraded.  It is possible that involvement in organized crime is a twisted way of achieving recognition.  Hannah Arendt, the philosopher, states in The Origins of Totalitarianism that, paradoxically, during the Nazi regime, one of the ways to become part of the social contract was to commit a crime; the perpetrator was recognized as responsible for the crime and hence needed to be punished. In this way the individual’s existence was recognized, albeit in a negative way.

How does academic research into organized crime now stand, what still needs to be researched?

In São Paulo, for reasons we should consider in the future, there have been very limited studies conducted on criminality, the most important of which without a doubt is that of Guaracy Minguardi, and the research by Alba Zaluar on the city of Campinas.  There are, however, researchers that focus on issues related to the life of citizens from low-income backgrounds, those on the lowest rung of the societal hierarchy, who see how much organized crime creates boundaries and contributes to a sort of chasm between well-being and survival.  We still, however, know little.  Certainly for those who have studied prisons, the presence of organized crime is nothing new.  One challenge is to understand how organized crime works within institutional walls, orchestrating synchronized events such as rebellions within the prison system and the disruption of urban life.

What is the history behind the eruption of this crisis?

It’s still early to say.  Apparently it was started by a rumor about the transfer of prisoners to Regime Especial Diferenciado (Detainment without privileges).  For those that have studied rebellions in São Paulo prisons, (Fernando Salla and I conducted research on this topic) this is just the tip of the iceberg.  The penitentiary system is characterized by unstable social relations, enormous distrust among individuals, and the constant need to negotiate everything—space, time, goods, women and men, even the right to life itself.  That is why the rules that organize life in prison are rather ambiguous: on one hand lax and easily broken, and on the other, extremely rigid, even punishable by death for mere suspicion or accusation.  Everyone lives on edge because danger could be anywhere.  When things function normally, that is to say, when there are no rebellions on the horizon, it is because these unstable pacts are respected.  When rebellions do arise, they are often times of reversals, the breaking of conventions and negotiations.

Could some specific motive have triggered the crisis?

There has been a lot of talk about the PCC having enough money to hire lawyers and elect as least two congressmen, a state and a federal representative.  These rumors circulate through the press.  Maybe some actor looking for personal gain upset the business chain, triggering the process. But they’re rumors, fed by stories taken from the international literature on prison rebellions.  Who knows, perhaps one day the truth will surface and we will discover that the motivation is far less imaginative than we now think.  In any case, this motivation is not unrelated to the structure of power inside the São Paulo prison system.

Is there any relation between the PCC, the Red Command in Rio, and organized crime factions in other states?  What are the chances of crises like the one in São Paulo erupting regionally or nationally?

I don’t have the information I would need to answer that question with even the slightest degree of confidence.  Another crisis, however, is possible because even considering the specifics of the São Paulo case, São Paulo is not as different from the rest of the country as we might imagine.  We must remember that organized crime has extensive territorial bases that span states and national societies, making it possible for crises to arise in other states.  With respects to the connection between the PCC and other factions such as the Red Command, it’s hard to separate fact from fiction. In these stories there is always an aspect of heroism which makes rebelling bandits seem like the striking factory workers of the 19th and early 20th centuries, as if it were a just war, something akin to “bandits of the world unite!”  Clearly this is an exaggeration.

What do you think of the reaction of the civil and military police to the crisis?  What could have been done better?  What would be ‘intelligent’ measures to take?

The speeches of the civil and military police are charged with revenge. I understand that the deaths of colleagues demand reparation and revenge.  After all, this notion has not totally disappeared from the modern system of punishment, as Durkheim demonstrated.  In other words, with very few exceptions, these are antiquated responses for new problems, problems that have emerged in the past three decades.  I return to Hannah Arendt: when political thought is dominated by habit and convention, there is no possible ways out, and hence no chance of joint action, it is the ability to act together that brings about the new and makes life in society possible.

What kind of alternative sentences or punishment should be implemented?

I don’t know if alternative sentencing should be applied to delinquents with extremely violent crime or homicide on their records.  I think alternative methods should be used to punish less serious crimes.  This would help break down a deeply-rooted custom of our judicial authorities—that of awarding special privileges in prison—and would contribute to the reduction of the incarcerated population.  In addition, alternative sentencing were in fact adopted, it would be necessary to create efficient mechanisms to monitor them, none of which are currently taking place.

(*translator’s note: Much of the population has to make do without bank accounts)

Co-translated by Emily L. Reiser and Catherine Griffith