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Stabilization and Humanitarian Action in Haiti

ROBERT MUGGAH

Stabilization missions that combine defence, diplomacy, and development are gaining traction in post-conflict and fragile states and cities.¹ Notwithstanding donor preoccupation with fragility, the discourse, practice, and outcomes of stabilization – even narrowly conceived in terms of reducing violence and restoring basic security – remain under-conceptualized. Moreover, the implications of stabilization and stability operations for humanitarian action, including relief agency impartiality, neutrality, and access, have yet to be adequately considered. This chapter reviews the evolution of stabilization activities after Haiti’s descent into extreme violence in 2004 and their implications for humanitarian action more generally. It does not focus extensively on the period following the devastating earthquake of January 2010.²

This chapter documents the experiences of three distinct stabilization initiatives advanced by a wide assortment of multilateral and bilateral agencies active in Haiti before and immediately after the 2010 natural disaster. Although differing subtly in form and content, these efforts were all broadly conceived within a security-first perspective. Stabilization is thus intended to restore and reinforce the capacity of the state to provide legitimate security. Specifically, such efforts are expected to bring about the conditions for the rule of law (justice and due process, legitimate policing, penal services, and so on) to take hold and, ultimately, for development to proceed. In order to shed light on the practice of stabilization, this chapter specifies key

differences in how stabilization is operationally expressed – particularly between the United Nations, the United States, and a constellation of ostensibly middle-power donors such as Canada, Norway, and Brazil.

Overall, stabilization appears to have generated tentative but nonetheless important (temporally specific) returns in security and safety. These gains can be measured in relation to real and perceived reductions in the incidence of victimization and improvements in other metrics of safety and security. Although still precarious, stabilization has also created spaces for certain forms of socioeconomic development. The news is not all positive, however. In the absence of a rapid and meaningful scaling up of legitimate policing authority throughout Haiti and its capital, Port-au-Prince, superficial gains were and continue to be heavily dependent on continued (UN) Brazilian-led peacekeeping presence.³ In contrast to other settings such as Iraq and Afghanistan, humanitarian agencies operating in Haiti between 2004 and 2009, while initially uncertain how to engage with proponents of stabilization, gradually adopted a pragmatic approach to collaboration.⁴

Reviewing Stabilization in Haiti

Haiti is alternately categorized as fragile, failing, and failed in international security and development circles.⁵ The deepening of collective violence in 2003 and 2004 that led to the ousting of former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was attributed to a host of external and internal factors, including historically embedded patterns of political behaviour among the country's elites, geopolitical influence, and chronic failures of governance and service delivery.⁶ From 2007 onward, however, the country was (re)cast by some international actors as a priority concern in the Western hemisphere.⁷ Despite a renewal of interest and engagement in wider private sector and development opportunities in the country in 2008 and 2009, donors were preoccupied with securing borders, containing so-called unregulated migration, preventing narcotics trafficking and arms flows, and controlling gang-related and organized criminal violence. Before and after the devastating earthquake of 2010, most observers agreed that the probability of “external” events affecting an already acutely vulnerable population – from the global financial crisis and attendant escalation in food prices to massive hurricanes and storms – would ensure that Haiti is trapped in a chronic humanitarian crisis.

The recipient of considerable inflows of overseas development assistance for decades, Haiti saw twenty-first century investments converging progressively on security promotion, stabilization, recovery, and reconstruction.

This marked a departure from the 1980s and 1990s, when aid was concentrated alternately on the promotion of “good governance” and institutional reform or on supporting non-governmental organizations (NGOs).⁸ In the wake of successive UN missions since 1991, the UN adopted its first genuinely “integrated” peace support operation in 2004 – the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). In this way, it aimed to merge peacekeeping activities more clearly with civilian activities in the delivery of core services and ultimately the “exit” of peacekeepers from the country.⁹ Despite major challenges and episodes of violence, security and safety on the ground appeared to have steadily improved, particularly since 2007.

A major emphasis of international action in Haiti has been, and continues to be, on containing and, more recently, reducing armed violence through support for community security in urban centres.¹⁰ Such programs have become increasingly prominent in the wake of coercive actions pursued by MINUSTAH peacekeepers between 2004 and 2006 in key urban slums, notably Cité Soleil and Bel Air.¹¹ While variously defined, violence appears to have diminished substantially in areas targeted by these community security interventions. Randomized household surveys of nine hundred families undertaken in 2009 detected significant reductions in key indicators of armed violence – physical assaults, sexual assaults, and homicide – since the launch of specific initiatives (see Figures 16.1, 16.2, and 16.3¹²). Statistical correlations require further testing and refinement, but empirical findings suggest an undeniable association.¹³

As discussed at length below, the humanitarian sector initially kept its distance from stabilization interventions. For example, humanitarian agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) operated more or less autonomously and according to strict internal standard operating procedures, establishing a presence through the provision and maintenance of hospitals/trauma wards, targeted relief assistance, and specific mandated activities. Meanwhile, together with the Haitian National Police (HNP), MINUSTAH and a range of development agencies gradually consolidated their activities in areas “seized” or recovered from local gangs between 2007 and 2009.¹⁴ Specifically, the ICRC and MSF began reducing certain protection-oriented activities in these areas on the grounds that safety had been restored. At the same time, MINUSTAH and a number of humanitarian agencies progressively expanded and strengthened their cooperation.

With development activities assuming a higher priority from 2007 to 2009,¹⁵ bilateral donors such as the US, Canada, and Norway actively sought

FIGURE 16.1

Reduction in the number of physical assaults in urban slums in Haiti, January 2004 to August 2009




FIGURE 16.2

Reduction in the number of sexual assaults in urban slums in Haiti, January 2004 to August 2009





FIGURE 16.3

Reduction in the number of murders in urban slums in Haiti, January 2004 to August 2009



to reinforce stabilization and development in Haiti. They launched unilateral interventions (US) or supported UN and NGO-led activities (Canada and Norway). These interventions were expected to enhance the capacity of the Haitian state – especially its public institutions and service providers – to restore its monopoly over the legitimate use of force. What distinguishes the current stabilization agenda from earlier efforts to promote security are several key characteristics:

- clear definition as short-term (two to three years), emphasizing security promotion and police presence, not necessarily development
- joint operations with military and police actors and development agencies to win hearts and minds
- municipal and neighbourhood-oriented schemes emphasizing “inclusive” community “decision-making.”

Although they have certain similarities in discourse, the practice and outcomes of such actions are, in fact, more different than widely appreciated.

UN Approach: The Stick and Carrot

MINUSTAH itself embodies the normative and political determination of UN member states and donor agency efforts to promote stability and reduce violence in order to restore order/governance and development. Discursively, a series of UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions highlight the expectations of member states that stabilization would cause the basic conditions for security and development to take hold on the ground. Programmatically, the UN approach to stabilization combined enforcement-led activities administered by UN “Blue Helmets” with community-led conflict prevention and the restoration of social cohesion and infrastructure. Since the beginning, however, there was a notable institutional separation between MINUSTAH peacekeepers on the one hand and MINUSTAH civilian and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)–led interventions on the other, even with the existence of a moderate level of communication between personnel.¹⁶

Despite the wider emphasis of the UN system on stabilization, its constituent parts pursued separate, if parallel, tracks. With respect to UN peacekeepers, the Brazilian-led force sought to establish territorial control and to consolidate its hold through the establishment of a tangible presence in “priority” or “red” zones. Its emphasis was on repressive operations where necessary, physical confrontation and disarmament, and, more recently, joint patrols with HNP counterparts.¹⁷ As for UN civilian and UNDP actors, their efforts were divided into two analogous initiatives – the Community Violence Reduction (CVR) program and the now-defunct Community Security Programme (CSP). The former consisted of a reformed “integrated” Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program formerly managed by MINUSTAH and the UNDP, and continues to operate in twelve areas throughout the country.¹⁸ Meanwhile, the CSP included activities undertaken by the UNDP in nine areas,¹⁹ although the project was terminated prematurely by the national authorities.²⁰

Despite the important (and controversial) gains of UN peacekeeping activities, these civilian-led stabilization interventions achieved mixed returns. For example, although lauded by some host and bilateral government officials, UN personnel, and NGOs for enhancing stability in the short term, UN peacekeepers were also heavily criticized. Instead of reducing the presence and activities of gangs, muscular operations in peri-urban areas may have unintentionally dispersed and radicalized them.²¹ Others contend that the military had considerable prestige and cachet among the local

population – an observation supported by survey evidence.²² As understanding of the dynamics of gang structures grew – including the “bazes” and affiliated actors²³ – there was a growing consensus that their corresponding levels of influence were vastly diminished in 2009 compared with 2007.

Other challenges to UN stabilization efforts were more institutional and bureaucratic than substantive. For example, attempts to achieve an integrated approach collapsed on several occasions – described by some insiders as an “amicable divorce.”²⁴ One reason for this was related to the many administrative and organizational challenges associated with “integration” as a UN-wide project more generally. For example, in 2009 the UN Country Team (UNCT) consisted of fourteen separate agencies, funds, and programs.²⁵ And although the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC) served then as now as the permanent link between MINUSTAH and the rest of the mission, the position was frequently overwhelmed.²⁶ Nevertheless, MINUSTAH’s CVR program appeared to be making important headway in the twelve areas where it was operating before the 2010 earthquake.²⁷

The US Approach: Fast and Furious

Meanwhile, alongside other activities, the US government launched the Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI) in 2007.²⁸ The HSI was designed with support from the Defense Department and the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Together with guidance from the US Army Corps of Engineers, the HSI was expected to be implemented by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the private security company (PSC) DynCorp International and serve as a model for future stabilization efforts in Haiti and more widely.²⁹ The HSI initially focused on a large neighbourhood widely regarded as affected by systemic and chronic violence – Cité Soleil. This neighbourhood of some 300,000 residents was long marked out as a centre of acute criminal and political violence, transitory migration, and moribund infrastructure. Importantly, the HSI was deliberately undertaken in areas that MINUSTAH peacekeepers had largely cleared of gangs. According to key informants on the ground, the presence and authority of gangs was greatly diminished compared with 2004-06. Crucially, the HSI also emphasized an approach that did not directly engage with gangs or related structures themselves, distinguishing it from UN and other approaches, described below.

The HSI, with the IOM and DynCorp as implementing partners, committed over US\$20 million over two years to a combination of “bricks-and-mortar” operations and community-driven social welfare projects.³⁰ The initiative adopted a two-pronged approach to security promotion. First, it emphasized large-scale infrastructure activities such as roadbuilding and the construction of a central police station and modest police posts.³¹ Second, it promoted development interventions – activities explicitly intended to win the hearts and minds of residents and undermine the legitimacy and authority of gangs – including literally hundreds of small-scale development projects. Importantly, the HSI was designed not so much to promote development as an *end*³² but rather to use aid instrumentally as a *means* of opening the door for international and national agencies to consolidate activities. The Achilles’ heel of the program, however, was always its transition or exit strategy.³³ The overall success of the US approach depended on whether the police – specifically, the HNP – would be capable of sustaining security gains, a reality that had not materialized before the 2010 earthquake.³⁴

Nevertheless, the HSI advanced several straightforward objectives, many of which were achieved during its short lifespan. These included the generation of the necessary security conditions to enhance police presence and reduce UN peacekeeping presence in volatile areas, and the marginalization of spoilers through community actions (through so-called community forums, a social technology borrowed from the MINUSTAH Community Violence Reduction program). According to USAID, indicators of success included a reduction in threats from gangs, a reduction in the use of security forces for political repression, enhanced performance of security forces, strengthening of subordination of communities to legitimate government authority, enhanced public confidence in security forces, and consent for MINUSTAH.³⁵ Secondary impacts – from improved socioeconomic conditions to increased access to justice – were considered less central to overall success.³⁶ In this way, the HSI deviated from more conventional development practice. For example, HSI applied certain forms of conditionality to Cité Soleil neighbourhoods where gang activity persisted or threatened the outcomes of funded interventions – in some cases withholding assistance or ending projects to induce compliance. Observers close to the process claimed that some of these actions generated meaningful results and lasting changes in behaviour, though this is now impossible to test.

It is useful to highlight certain distinguishing features of HSI compared with other stabilization approaches. For one, the program explicitly avoided

the option to “negotiate” or “engage” directly with gangs and criminal actors – preferring instead to focus on undermining their source of legitimacy and enhancing the credibility of the municipal structures and the police in recovered “under-governed spaces.” Specifically, then, it sought to establish a permanent police presence in Cité Soleil through rebuilding of physical infrastructure and training of the HNP and equipping of police stations, although it did not include provisions for recurring expenditures for police services or equipment. Finally, HSI identified and funded medium-scale projects with residents in Cité Soleil to offer them alternatives to gang rule, and sought to promote enhanced community/police relations³⁷ and community policing.³⁸

Although its benefits are heavily publicized, the overall outcome of the US approach to stabilization was mixed. Indeed, to the United States’ credit, the intervention featured a clear theory of change and a robust surveillance mechanism to track outcomes over time. On the one hand, violence appeared to have been reduced in key catchment areas and the construction of a major road promised to transform formal and informal market trading. Since the expectation was to reduce violence to levels comparable with those in other areas of the country – that is, to normalize and “contain” crime – it appears that the intervention at least partially fulfilled expectations. The extent to which police presence was enhanced and development resumed in a fundamental sense was harder to ascertain in late 2009, however. Some donor informants claimed that dividends were limited due to the more unilateral approach and noted a subsequent “pushback” from the national and municipal authorities, who were allegedly more wary of American interventionism.

The “Others”: From the Ground Up

When it came to security promotion, bilateral donors such as Canada, Norway, and, to some extent, Brazil³⁹ appeared to support both multilateral interventions emphasizing justice and police reform and more voluntary and community-oriented projects on the ground. Although these activities were often characterized as “stabilization,” their shape and character revealed important differences from alternatives discussed above. Indeed, middle-power donors frequently invested in a range of “soft” stabilization activities such as “conflict mitigation,” “civic mediation,” and “community development,” even if they were also inclined to support the state’s capacity to deliver security through improved policing, customs, penal services, and justice reform. One example of their alternative approach to stabilization

was the “integrated violence reduction program” launched in early 2007 by a Brazilian NGO, Viva Rio, in the heart of Port-au-Prince.

The program integrated security with development activities in the most practical way. Specifically, it combined direct gang mediation with rain harvesting, water collection and distribution, sanitation and hygiene activities, solid waste and sewer management, education for at-risk youth, women’s health promotion, and recreation activities. The initiative was funded by Canada’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Team (START), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), and was supported by the Brazilian government and some funds from the MINUSTAH CVR program.⁴⁰ In contrast to externally implemented UN or US activities that sought to engineer new mechanisms, the program purposely harnessed existing actors, institutions, and sources of legitimacy. Program implementers negotiated directly with individual *bazes* in selected neighbourhoods – including community and gang leadership. Although this approach offered an important entry point into community structures, some critics argued that it could also unintentionally reinforce informal and possibly illegitimate actors and activities. The intended and unintended consequences of this approach were recently assessed.⁴¹

Physically based in Bel Air – with a catchment of ninety thousand residents – the program blended thick theoretical, evidence-based, and cultural understanding with a flexible incremental approach on the ground. For example, on the basis of a major census and intensive ethnographic studies, the program-implementing agency, Viva Rio, brokered a peace accord between more than a dozen different gang-affected zones and negotiated lotteries and bursaries in exchange for reductions in homicidal violence between 2007 and 2009.⁴² Crucially, Viva Rio was able to engage communities early on in an informal way, establishing formal and informal relations with MINUSTAH and the HNP, which were more directly involved in stabilization. Instead of marginalizing gangs, they explicitly brought *les bazes* into an iterative process of negotiation, dialogue, and ultimately self-regulation. Likewise, Viva Rio consciously drew MINUSTAH peacekeepers into the process, complementing their activities with training in community relations/outreach and encouraging a “softer,” less coercive approach.

Like the UN and US approaches, the “other” approach deliberately located its interventions within a security-first model, recognizing that a community’s development potential is most usefully tapped after real and perceived violence is diminished. Unlike the UN and US approaches,

however, the latter blended development interventions directly into the program rather than leaving them to other municipal actors or NGOs who were expected to assume responsibilities after real and perceived security was restored. Viva Rio promoted the development of a multi-pronged water management system that entailed the introduction of water kiosks in underserved areas, rainwater harvesting in primary schools, and the strengthening of municipal (piped/kiosk) water delivery. Other, ostensibly developmental activities included educational activities in schools (including vocational education), recreational and sporting alternatives (“soccer diplomacy”), and concerts with Haiti’s wildly popular rara and hip-hop music bands. Despite some important gains, however, there were also clear challenges associated with transferring or embedding activities into what were frayed and predominantly illegitimate public institutions.

The “other” approach offers an example of south-south social technology transfer – with experiences from gang-affected urban slums/favelas in Rio being adapted and transferred to the Haitian context. While endorsing many of the same objectives as the UN and US activities – including reductions in real and perceived violence, reinforcement of the gains made by MINUSTAH, and more legitimate and accountable policing – it exemplified an adaptive and opportunistic approach to security promotion.⁴³ It sought to reinforce, in many ways, alternative nodes of legitimacy and authority through investment in local institutions.⁴⁴ Moreover, budgeted at a total of US\$4.5 million (between 2006 and 2009), it offered a low-cost alternative to the US and UN. It is critical to note, however, that Bel Air was at the time a comparatively more stable social and economic environment than Cité Soleil, even if violence rates were still reportedly higher than the national average.⁴⁵

Implications of Stabilization for Humanitarian Action

The humanitarian community operating in Haiti between 2004 and 2009 observed the emergence of multiple stabilization agendas with indifference and, in some cases, apprehension. Although they were instinctively suspicious of repressive activities such as those supported by MINUSTAH, their attitudes softened over time – especially among civilian UN agencies, NGOs, the ICRC, and Médecins Sans Frontières.⁴⁶ It should be recalled that there were many actors engaged in various ways in the humanitarian and development enterprise in Haiti both before and after the earthquake. Besides the dozen or so UN agencies that comprised the UN Country Team,

there were literally thousands of NGOs and non-registered community-based organizations operating throughout the country in 2009. All of these actors confronted various guises of “instability” – from acute violence to hurricanes and floods. It is important to note that while the perceptions and attitudes of the humanitarian community towards stabilization may have shifted over the past decade, they are by no means homogeneous.

While difficult to generalize, humanitarian agencies harboured a complex love/hate relationship with the security sector, including MINUSTAH, the HNP, and private security companies. Due to their diversity and competing mandates, it is perhaps unsurprising that attitudes and operating procedures are heterogeneous. Indeed, such tensions are hardly unique to Haiti: persistent divisions in agency approaches to civil/military engagement in Haiti are analogous to those elsewhere, including Afghanistan, Sudan, or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).⁴⁷ Put simply, on one side were the Dunantists – including the ICRC and MSF – who in theory opposed “integration” with political and military actors and maintained their autonomy and principled, albeit pragmatic, approach.⁴⁸ On the other side were the more Wilsonian NGOs – Oxfam, CARE, and Concern – who appeared to adopt more divergent approaches that entailed tentative yet closer forms of cooperation with military and policing actors, MINUSTAH or otherwise.

Across the humanitarian sector, however, attitudes towards engagement with proponents of stabilization began to warm appreciably between 2007 and 2009. With the exception of the ICRC and MSF, most relief agencies acknowledged that they had virtually no capacity to operate effectively in urban and rural areas affected by systemic violence between 2004 and 2005. Likewise, virtually all agencies agreed that from 2007 to 2009, collective violence diminished even as other forms of violence (such as sexual and gender-based) became more visible.⁴⁹ That MINUSTAH, and to a lesser extent the HNP, regained the humanitarian space through force is widely recognized as a critical if controversial achievement. Most prominent humanitarian and development NGOs observed that although they might have been able to access certain areas, they would never have been capable of doing so as quickly or on an equivalent scale without aggressive intervention and stabilization. In other words, humanitarian agencies acknowledged that the security sector regained spaces previously inaccessible to them.

The case of MSF reveals how civil/military relations changed between 2004 and 2009. Specifically, between 2004 and 2007 there was virtually no

contact between MINUSTAH and MSF. In fact, MSF established directives to deliberately reduce formal and informal exchange between its personnel and peacekeepers and police. This was considered an especially sensitive area since MSF was operating in Cité Soleil, where MINUSTAH was active, with many civilians killed and arrested.⁵⁰ Indeed, certain MSF hospitals were the site of considerable violence between 2004 and 2005. Beginning in 2008, however, the MSF/MINUSTAH relationship steadily improved. In the wake of massive floods in August and September that year, for example, MSF was provided with UN air transport and used MINUSTAH bases for coordination. Personal relations between commanders, officers, and senior MSF staff warmed manifestly, due largely to personalities rather than more fundamental internal institutional adaptations.

The ICRC approach, while sharing similarities with that of MSF, hints at how civil/military relations may be stronger than publicly assumed. Much like the US approach discussed above, the ICRC conceived of Haiti as a “laboratory” for new engagement in urban areas affected by armed gangs (see Chapter 15). Beginning in 2006 and 2007, for example, the agency explicitly linked its prison outreach activities (with detained gang leaders) to mediation and access activities, the location of field hospitals, and the strengthening of water provision⁵¹ in Cité Soleil.⁵² From late 2008 to 2009, the ICRC also began reducing direct actions, supporting instead the Haitian National Red Cross in neighbouring slums such as Martissant. Meanwhile, an expansion of operations was planned for 2010 (before the earthquake), including the establishment of a functioning ambulatory service and health posts in Bel Air, another urban slum.

Overall, the ICRC found that it encountered comparatively few challenges associated with the stabilization agenda. Indeed, it observed that stabilization expanded rather than closed the humanitarian space. More provocatively, ICRC officials observed that the objectives of both MINUSTAH and the ICRC between 2004 and 2009 were more unified than widely believed. In practical terms, although collaboration with ongoing stabilization activities (UN, US, or the others) was limited until 2007, it expanded dramatically in 2008. For example, the US and the ICRC worked together to resolve practical issues in Cité Soleil such as the expansion of water supplies and provision of electricity. Indeed, the ICRC signalled a readiness to work more closely with the UN and the US. To many outsiders, the ICRC often appears to adopt a high level of autonomy and independence from other agencies. In reality, however, it routinely works closely with most proponents of stabilization, including military actors. It is also

possible, perhaps probable, that Haiti represents a special case where tight civil/military integration was more feasible than elsewhere.⁵³

Notwithstanding the experiences of the ICRC and MSE, there appeared to be some concern that supporters of stabilization were insufficiently apprised of humanitarian mandates, even if this was changing by late 2009. Many MINUSTAH military actors were described by humanitarian NGOs as lacking a clear understanding of the value or requirements of humanitarian space. In some cases, humanitarian agencies resented their “forced” integration – the blending of relief, development, and security promotion agendas – as expressed by the UN or other multilateral and bilateral agencies. Some NGOs found that MINUSTAH and policing actors (as well as certain bilateral agencies) applied considerable pressure, including on humanitarian agencies, to adopt a more assertive political agenda and become involved in “civilian” activities in the wake of military operations. Meanwhile, non-UN agencies feared being co-opted by the UN or perceived by civilians as its appendages.⁵⁴ Indeed, some complained that MINUSTAH effectively superimposed a host of new “civilian” activities on what was already being undertaken by the UNCT and NGOs.⁵⁵

Conclusion

Although the discourse of stabilization is frequently invoked by a wide variety of government and non-governmental actors, its practice and outcomes exhibit a high degree of variation. More important for the purposes of this chapter, the case of Haiti offers an example where “stabilization” – although aggressively pursued and widely criticized – generated a meaningful reduction in both real and perceived violence. It should be recalled, however, that the effectiveness of stabilization is likely to be heavily contingent on sustained MINUSTAH peacekeeping and police presence. Not surprisingly, given the natural disaster, as of 2010 there was no clear peacekeeping strategy without the military. The restoration of a legitimate physical police presence, much less community policing, appears to be a far-off goal.

Nevertheless, while the evidence is still preliminary, Haiti offers a case where stabilization did not severely compromise humanitarian action. To the contrary, despite initial reluctance to engage with UN peacekeepers, both humanitarian and development actors gradually came to welcome stabilization. Although some humanitarian agencies engaged with military actors less than others, most adopted pragmatic strategies while seeking not to compromise their mandates or standard operating procedures. Likewise, exogenous shocks – including major hurricanes in August and September

2008 – appeared to hasten greater integration between military and humanitarian actors, suggesting that the reality of stabilization is being accepted by most on the ground. The extent to which the earthquake of January 2010 has changed all of this remains to be seen.

NOTES

- 1 See Sarah Collinson, Samir Elhawary, and Robert Muggah, “States of Fragility: Stabilization and Its Implications for Humanitarian Action,” Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) Working Paper (July 2010), online: Overseas Development Institute <<http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/>> [“States of Fragility 1”], and Sarah Collinson, Samir Elhawary, and Robert Muggah “States of Fragility: Stabilisation and Its Implications for Humanitarian Action,” (2010) 34 *Disasters* (special edition) 275 [“States of Fragility 2”].
- 2 For more on post-earthquake dynamics, see Athena R. Kolbe, Royce A. Hutson, Harry Shannon, Eileen Trzcinski, Bart Miles, Naomi Levitz, Marie Puccio, Leah James, Jean Roger Noel, and Robert Muggah, “Mortality, Crime and Access to Basic Needs before and after the Haiti Earthquake” (2010) 26 *Medicine, Conflict and Survival* 281. Also see Robert Muggah, “The Effects of Stabilisation on Humanitarian Action in Haiti” (2010) 34 *Disasters* 444; and Robert Muggah and Athena R. Kolbe, “Haiti: Why an Accurate Count of Civilian Deaths Matters” *Los Angeles Times* (12 July 2011).
- 3 For a review of police activities in Haiti before and following the natural disaster, consult Robert Muggah and Athena R. Kolbe, “Securing the State: Haiti before and after the Earthquake” in *Small Arms Survey 2011* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- 4 For a review of stabilization activities in Afghanistan, see Stuart Gordon, “The United Kingdom’s Stabilisation Model and Afghanistan: The Impact on Humanitarian Actors” (2010) 34 *Disasters* 368.
- 5 See, e.g., Robert Muggah, “The Perils of Changing Donor Priorities in Fragile States: The Case of Haiti” in Jennifer Welsh and Ngaire Woods, eds., *Exporting Good Governance: Temptations and Challenges in Canada’s Aid Program* (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007).
- 6 See, e.g., Collinson *et al.*, “States of Fragility 2,” *supra* note 1, for a treatment of the political economy of state building in Haiti. The article finds that failures in stabilization and state building are routinely attributed to Haitians rather than to the contradictions generated by geopolitical manipulation and flawed prescriptions mandated from above.
- 7 In 2008, the UN appointed former US president Bill Clinton as a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Likewise, prominent financiers and academics such as George Soros, Paul Collier, Jeffery Sachs, and Paul Farmer have all invested in Haiti. See, e.g., “Haiti: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,” IMF Country Report No. 08/115 (March 2008), online: International Monetary Fund <<http://www.imf.org/>>.
- 8 See Muggah, “The Perils of Changing Donor Priorities,” *supra* note 5.

- 9 In order to support these efforts, a number of multilateral and bilateral agencies invested in recruitment, training, and deployment of police; prison reform; and control of water/land borders, while simultaneously restoring state institutions and lessening corruption through rule-of-law programs and investment in penal and criminal law reform.
- 10 See Nat J. Colletta and Robert Muggah, "Rethinking Post-War Security Promotion" (2009) 7 *Journal of Security Sector Management* 1, online: Center for Security Sector Management <<http://www.ssronline.org/jofssm/>>.
- 11 See Athena R. Kolbe and Royce A. Hutson, "Human Rights Abuse and Other Criminal Violations in Port-au-Prince, Haiti: A Random Survey of Households" (2006) 368 *The Lancet* 864; and Peter Hallward, *Damming the Flood: Haiti, Aristide and the Politics of Containment* (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2008).
- 12 Source (Figures 16.1, 16.2, and 16.3): Kolbe *et al.*, "Mortality, Crime and Access to Basic Needs," *supra* note 2.
- 13 See, for example, *ibid.*
- 14 For example, MINUSTAH and the UNDP launched an ill-fated DDR program in 2005 that stalled by 2006. Both MINUSTAH and the UNDP then separately launched "community violence reduction" programs from 2007 onward. MINUSTAH's program continues in twelve regions of the country and emphasizes community forums to identify local solutions to violence. The UNDP's intervention was shut down in 2008 due to disputes with the government and internal disarray.
- 15 An exception is humanitarian assistance targeting "disaster-affected" areas in the north of the country, as occurred during August and September 2008.
- 16 See, *e.g.*, R. Muggah, "Great Expectations: (Dis)integrated DDR in Sudan and Haiti" (2007) Issue 37 *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine*, online: Humanitarian Practice Network <<http://www.odihpn.org/>>.
- 17 Haiti's armed forces were dissolved by Aristide in 1995, a source of continued discontent among veterans. See Robert Muggah, *Securing Haiti's Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration*, Occasional Paper 14 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005).
- 18 These activities combine community forum (representative mechanisms designed to develop inclusive projects intended to reduce violence) and close collaboration with a national institution, the National Commission on DDR (CNDDR).
- 19 The program included violence reduction action plans designed through a participatory community-based diagnostic, and socioeconomic projects intended to jump-start local development.
- 20 The UNDP has subsequently put together a proposal for US\$7 million from the Millennium Development Goals Fund, together with IOM, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and others to pursue a similar program in five "rural" areas.
- 21 For examples of similar processes – the so-called "*mano dura*" policies and practices of anti-gang activities in Central America – consult Oliver Jütersonke, Robert Muggah, and Dennis Rodgers, "Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions in Central America" (2009) 40 *Security Dialogue* 373.

- 22 A major household survey tracking perceptions of the security sector in Haiti was conducted in 2005 and 2006 by Athena R. Kolbe and Dr. Royce A. Hutson. It found that attitudes towards MINUSTAH were comparatively negative. A more recent assessment by Kolbe *et al.* undertaken in 2009 found that resident attitudes had become more favourable, especially in areas most affected by MINUSTAH operations: Athena R. Kolbe, *Household Survey of Insecurity in Port-au-Prince: Preliminary Findings* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey/University of Michigan, 2009).
- 23 See, *e.g.*, Robert Muggah and Eric Calpas, "Stabilization from Above and Below: The Case of Port-au-Prince," in Mats Berdal and Dominik Zaum, eds., *Power after Peace: The Political Economy of Post-Conflict Statebuilding* (New York: Routledge, forthcoming).
- 24 See, *e.g.*, Muggah, "Great Expectations," *supra* note 16.
- 25 These include, among others, the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP, United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), UNESCO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), World Health Organization–Pan American Health Organization (WHO-PAHO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the World Bank, and IOM.
- 26 The DSRSG/RC/HC manages MINUSTAH's Humanitarian and Development pillar, and assumes responsibility for such portfolios as Community Violence Reduction initiatives (CVR Section), HIV-AIDS, gender, child protection, support to the electoral process, and humanitarian affairs (including OCHA). The DSRSG/RC/HC's office is staffed with an advisor for strategic planning, a partnership and donor relations officer, a coordination officer, and a humanitarian affairs officer. The DSRSG/RC/HC's office helps ensure ongoing and close coordination between MINUSTAH and agencies, funds, and programs through joint strategic meetings held between MINUSTAH section heads and the UNCT, along with thematic working groups such as the humanitarian forum, allowing for the permanent exchange of information and joint analysis and strategies.
- 27 See, *e.g.*, routine CVR monthly reports issued by the MINUSTAH/Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) section in Port-au-Prince.
- 28 In early 2007, a member of the Active Component of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC-A) deployed to Haiti with the interagency HSI team. The CRC-A member supported the Embassy in Port-au-Prince to create an administrative and logistics plan and budget for a new seven-person office that would coordinate the HSI with the Haitian government, the UN, and ongoing US bilateral development programs. The CRC-A member worked with the embassy management sections to get their input and to ensure their buy-in to the plan while keeping the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs and the Washington-based offices of USAID informed of the progress of the HSI support platform. See "Haiti" under "Where We Work," online: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization < <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/where/index.htm>>.

- 29 This new initiative is funded through a transfer authority from the Department of Defense. Section 1207 of the 2006 *National Defense Authorization Act* allows the transfer of funds to the Department of State for reconstruction and stabilization activities.
- 30 A review of the HSI was produced by David C. Becker and Robert Grossman-Vermaas, "Metrics for the Haiti Stabilization Initiative" (2011) 2 Prism 145, online: <<http://www.ndu.edu/>>.
- 31 A visit was undertaken to the principal police station (formerly a covered market) in Cité Soleil in November 2009. Site visits throughout Cité Soleil also revealed a considerable expansion of primary and secondary tarmac coverage. Similar types of operations were also pursued in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past five years, to positive effect.
- 32 HSI initiatives are expected to be undertaken in parallel with other USAID and development programs.
- 33 It should be noted that HSI personnel preferred the concept of "transition" to "exit." According to key informants, "transition" was gauged by the extent of police presence and real/perceived reductions in violence.
- 34 The last graduating class from the academy included 300 officers in 2007, but most were deployed to an area of interest to the Commissioner. Fewer than 30 officers are in Cité Soleil, although USAID hopes to see this increased to 130 by end 2009 and to 200 soon after.
- 35 See, e.g., USAID, "Haiti Stabilization Initiative: MPICE Data Analysis Phase II, Draft" (5 November 2008); USAID, "MPICE Phase II: Survey Results: Cité Soleil, Haiti. Draft" (10 November 2008); USAID, "Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) for the Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI), Presentation of Baseline Assessment" (May 2008). For more information, consult "The MPICE Metrics Framework and the Haiti Stabilization Initiative," online: <<http://www.usip.org/>>.
- 36 Metrics included a reduction in "social disintegration," population displacement, and demographic pressures, and an increase in access to basic needs and related social services. See "Haiti Stabilization Initiative: MPICE Data Analysis Phase II," *ibid.*
- 37 Specifically, a rule of law program that will support the Ministry of Justice in establishing a permanent judicial presence in Cité Soleil. Under the program, justice officials and community leaders will receive training and equipment to better serve the local community.
- 38 Its proponents also expected to introduce community policing doctrine before phasing out the program, although the 2010 earthquake undermined these efforts.
- 39 See, e.g., Robert Muggah and Iona Szabó de Carvalho, "Brazil's "Southern Effect" in Fragile Countries" *Open Democracy* (19 November 2009), online: Open Democracy <<http://www.opendemocracy.net/>>, for a review of Brazil's approach to fragile states.
- 40 CVR provided Viva Rio with funding for the "*tambou de la pay*" (low-violence merit-based scholarship program) in 2008. In 2009, it provided US\$300,000 for labour-intensive projects and a water cistern – a process mobilized through the CVR community forum.

- 41 For example, the Small Arms Survey fielded a large multi-disciplinary team to examine intended and unintended consequences. See Helen Moestue and Robert Muggah, *Social Integration, ergo, Stabilization: Assessing Viva Rio's Security and Development Programme in Port-Au-Prince* (Rio de Janeiro: CIDA Canada, MFA START Canada, MFA NCA Norway, 2009).
- 42 It is important to note that the "population" received direct benefits from the lotteries in 2007. As of 2008, however, gang leaders were also entitled to receive benefits from the monthly lotteries, an issue that has raised some concern among local NGOs and observers.
- 43 Viva Rio has also been criticized for being too flexible and close to the military. For example, it encouraged summer camps for children in MINUSTAH bases. This generated criticism from UNICEF, which claimed that this was a high-risk activity.
- 44 For example, the rainwater harvesting systems are installed in and managed by the schools and the health program is carried out in the schools. Viva Rio coordinates closely with the mayor's office on different issues and has a close collaboration with the public water utility company – CAMEP – and lately with Ministry of Public Works on solid waste management. This collaboration also has elements of informal or formal capacity building.
- 45 Rates of violence have dropped dramatically in Haiti since 2007: Kolbe, *Household Survey of Insecurity*, *supra* note 22. Even so, there appears to be a widespread perception that violence is higher than the regional average. This does not appear to be borne out by the limited evidence available. See, e.g., Reed Lindsay, "Eyeing Tourism, Haiti Battles Its Violent Reputation" *Christian Science Monitor* (20 June 2008), on-line: Christian Science Monitor <<http://www.csmonitor.com/>>.
- 46 A range of debates have taken place since at least 2004 within various coordination platforms – including the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee – and between agency directors and high-level personnel.
- 47 Collinson *et al.*, "States of Fragility 1," *supra* note 1.
- 48 MSF recently finished an internal audit of procedures and operations in order to review the conduct of both international and national personnel. Based on the charter of MSF, the agency must treat people without discrimination, pay staff no more than the agency decides, ensure no relations with national staff, maintain impartiality, and maintain distance from religious/political agendas. More practically, soldiers cannot enter centres with guns (armouries are set up outside), no military or policing actors can enter an MSF car, no military escorts are permitted, no flights on military planes or cars are permitted, and so on. These rules can generate a range of practical challenges; for example, in principle MSF cannot use USAID plastic sheeting or MINUSTAH helicopters during emergencies.
- 49 Although estimates vary, a recent survey detected a homicide rate of some 14-15 per 100,000 in key slums of Port-au-Prince, among the lowest rates in Latin America.
- 50 The relationship between MSF and MINUSTAH reached a low point when MSF denounced the Sri Lankan peacekeeping contingent for pedophilia, which resulted in the removal of more than a hundred soldiers.
- 51 Specifically, ICRC worked to reinstall local water boards in Cité Soleil – collecting funds at key water distribution points, thereby providing local resources for the national water authority to make routine repairs.

- 52 Similar activities have been underway since 2007 in Rio de Janeiro, where operations are opening up in favelas. See, for example, Robert Muggah and Albert Walter Souza Mulli, "Paving the Hills and Levelling the Streets: Counterinsurgency in Rio de Janeiro," *Current History* (forthcoming), and Chapter 15.
- 53 For example, the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is constructing a centre and the ICRC is supporting the design and development of related facilities.
- 54 There is a long history of NGOs being wary of the UN. NGOs believe that the UN seeks to act as the primary intermediary between states and NGOs.
- 55 For example, MINUSTAH, which is responsible for coordinating humanitarian actors, duplicated OCHA. Duplication of activities was (and, according to some, remains) a major concern for the humanitarian sector.