A Report on the Recent Changes in Perceptions of Security and Social Services in Bel Air, Haiti

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Introduction

Research on the availability and accessibility of social services, including security, in impoverished neighborhoods in Haiti has become a cornerstone of nongovernmental organizations' (NGO) interventions in such areas.[i] This research is seen as essential to the task of identifying the needs and resources of the area as well as establishing organizational legitimacy among the population, who are then thought able to participate in the decision-making processes that affect their lives. However, because this research's objective is to gather information from those who have first-hand knowledge of an area during a specific moment, it fails to address how perceptions of social services change in time. While neglecting the history of perceptions, it also fails to identify how neighborhood perceptions of social services are formed in relation to the ever-changing political configurations. For the reason that social services cannot be unlinked from the work of government—in which I include the state and, crucially for Haiti, state-like actors such as the United Nations (UN) and NGOs—it is essential for research to address how perceptions of social services and those of government are mutually structured. This is the task of this report. It will be accomplished by articulating the perceptions of security and social services of residents in the poor neighborhood of central Port-au-Prince called Bel Air, and will analyze how these perceptions have developed in relation to dynamic local and national political configurations. Using oral histories and semi-structured focus groups, this report will trace such development through four phases of political history: (1) the period of the Duvalier dictatorships; (2) the democratic transition, which includes the two presidential mandates of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the intervening provisional governments; (3) the

period of conflict, which followed the 2004 ousting of Aristide and lasted to 2006; and (4) the contemporary state-MINUSTAH political configuration.

This report originates from the request of the *Small Arms Survey* (SAS), an independent organization based in Geneva that serves to monitor national and international (governmental and non-governmental) initiatives to reduce violence. The SAS was commissioned by *Viva Rio*, a Brazilian nongovernmental organization, to evaluate its organization and interventions in the Bel Air region of Port-au-Prince. *Viva Rio* has been intervening in Bel Air since 2004 with projects designed to promote peace and improve neighborhood infrastructure. In order to better evaluate such projects, SAS determined that it was necessary to acquire detailed information regarding two matters. Firstly, background information regarding the confluence of the political history of Haiti and the political life of Bel Air would be essential to understanding how *Viva Rio's* projects address the social complexity of their setting, including the nature of conflict and the history of social service provisions in Bel Air. Secondly, a detailed account of the history of residents' perceptions of security and social services—specifically, highlighting perceived changes from the period of conflict to the present—would be critical to not only evaluating the social reception of their projects vis-à-vis other initiatives, including those of the state, but also advising future projects. This report serves to provide this information and is intended for SAS to use toward the production of its evaluation of *Viva Rio*.

Historical Background

Political History: Duvalier to Present

This report attempts to understand how Bel Air residents' perceptions of security and social services have changed in the era of peacekeeping, political crisis, and violence that has marked Haiti since February 7, 1986—the date Jean-Claude Duvalier and his wife left Haiti with their families, thereby ending the thirty-year dictatorship begun by his father, François. The seeds of this dictatorship began in June 1957, when the Haitian army—acting with the support of François Duvalier—massacred hundreds of supporters of then president Daniel Fignolé in Bel Air. Laying the basis for Duvalier's totalitarian rule,

this act enabled his election later that year and cemented widespread disapproval of the regime among Bel Air residents for years to come.

Despite this opposition, the dictatorship profoundly shaped how power is forged and negotiated in Bel Air. Both Duvalier dictatorships were characterized by an extreme centralization of power that was maintained through a vast network of government patronage. This network included, but was not limited to, the ever-expanding *Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale* (VSN)), colloquially known as "*Tontons Makout*"— an informal, civil militia that enforced consensus by using routine violence to terrorize the population (Trouillot 1990). Not only have former members of the *VSN* both led and participated in later political upheavals, they also continue to influence the informal, gang-like structure of local political and social movements. The current gang-like groups, known as *baz,* in Bel Air are one example of how armed, informal associations continue to dominate local political life. Since the fall of the Duvalier governments, such groups have been able to influence (to varying degrees) everyday life in Bel Air, including development aid, investment initiatives, cultural festivals, social services, and international and national security efforts in the neighborhood.

As a result of the regime's excessive political violence, the departure of Duvalier was cast—in public protest and international politics alike—as a clear step toward democracy. Yet the Haitian state immediately fell under the control of the *Conseil National de Gouvernement* (CNG). This transitional regime continued to systematically silence political dissenters. From 1986 to 1987, the CNG opened fire on several public demonstrations, which demanded a series of social reforms, including women's rights, tax reform, educational change, and social welfare. Also persecuting former Duvalier supporters, the CNG resulted in killing more civilians during this time than the government of Jean-Claude Duvalier (Trouillot 1990). After a forged election (in which the CNG closed polls after one hour and opened fire on potential voters) and a subsequent *coup d'état,* the Haitian people were finally able to participate in democratic elections in 1990. They elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Roman Catholic Priest and outspoken advocate of the poor who rose to acclaim by preaching a "liberation theology" from the progressive, grassroots wing of Haiti's Roman Catholic Church, the *ti legliz* (little church) movement.

Opposing his agenda to Duvalierism, President Aristide represented himself as an exemplar of democracy and accordingly, the best medium to "voice the nation." Aristide's message was well received in both rural peasant communities and the popular neighborhoods of the capital, especially Bel Air where he claimed nearly unanimous support. The tremendous support that he received in the election, nearly 70% nationwide, became locally known as "the flood." This image would then become an icon of Aristide's campaign for social change, when he renamed his political movement *Lavalas,* which is a Creole word for a great, tropical flood that begins high in the mountains and sweeps away *everything* in its path to the sea (Meehan 1999). This image would also define his political party, *Fanmi Lavalas* ("Lavalas family"), which he formed in 1996 after breaking with his initial two political parties, *Front National pour le Changement et la Démocratie* (FNCD) and *Organisation du Peuple en Lutte* (OPL), who were largely responsible for Aristide's early political success.

Upon taking office, Aristide attempted to carry out on his plan for a "second revolution." He sought to eradicate the caste-like system of social and racial inequalities that has bedeviled Haiti throughout its colonial and postcolonial history.[ii] The series of reforms, which Aristide initiated in order to restructure the longstanding relationship between political power and social class, were comprised of formal as well as informal tactics of *dechoukaj*, or uprooting, the Duvalier system. He arrested former leaders and members of the civil militia and other known supporters of the Duvalier governments. He also simultaneously weakened the dictatorships' centralization of state power by reconfiguring the rural provinces' political administrations toward a model that empowered local leaders, rather than state representatives from the capital. On a less official basis, he selected people from his base of support, such as residents of Bel Air, to work in government offices, ministries, and companies; a practice which he would bolster during his second mandate (Dupuy 2007). He also encouraged forms of violence against opponents of his government by refusing to publicly condemn brutal and often fatal attacks by civilians against former Duvalierists. Yet before this radical cleansing of the past political order could be fully realized, Aristide was ousted—a mere nine months after being elected—in a *coup d'état* that was led by the business and military elite.

A period of three years followed in which the government led by General Raoul Cedras was subject to a devastating embargo administered by the Organization of American States. Cedras' government also did not alleviate the pattern of political violence but rather openly attacked and killed leaders of the opposition as well as opened fire on mass protests. Severely affected by the embargo and by escalating political violence, over forty thousand Haitians took to the high seas during this time in desperate attempts to seek political asylum in the United States. Many residents of Port-au-Prince, however, began seeking political refuge in a different way. They mobilized neighborhood communities into *baz* that erected barricades and policed local neighborhoods (Aristide and Richardson 1995). With a prominent presence in Bel Air, these measures would serve as a precursor to the violence that later established *baz* as a prominent local authority.

Under the UN-sponsored and US-led military intervention in 1994, Aristide was restored as President and authorized to serve out the end of his term. In office until 1996, he was succeeded by his former Prime Minister, René Préval (who is now in his second term as president), and then reelected in 2001. Following his 2001 election, Aristide was determined to stave off a repetition of the 1991 *coup* by governing with little to no opposition. To bolster this agenda, Aristide sought to reinstate many of the "clientalistic" practices of the state, which he had so ardently campaigned to dismantle (Dupuy 2007). The most prominent example was the establishment of an independent force of vigilante gangs, known locally as *chimès*, that attacked and killed members of the opposition, violently disrupted demonstrations, burned their residences and headquarters, and engaged in numerous other human rights abuses (Dupuy 2005). These gangs drew on and reinforced the networks of *baz* of the capital's poor shantytowns and slums, one of which was the inner-city neighborhood of Bel Air. To varying degrees, these gangs succeeded in turning their neighborhoods into wards under their control; in some cases, they were even able to take control of state services, such as policing (Caroit 2004, Dupuy 2005). The government did not officially sanction these gangs; but, their links with government officials—notably, those of the police and official security—facilitated a ceaseless flow of cash and arms for their operations (Caroit 2003, Dupuy 2007). In this way, the government's lack of effort to repress them encouraged an entanglement

between the institutions of the government, the police, and criminal networks. In addition to monopolizing power, these tactics succeeded in producing *Lavalas* strongholds within the capital's poor, inner-city neighborhoods. Yet they also produced fractions within the *Lavalas* movement. Ironically, as neighborhood-based *chimès* gained political authority in the service of Aristide, they began to use this power to initiate oppositional movement*s* within these same neighborhoods and outlying districts. Spiraling beyond centralized control, these oppositional movements compromised the authority and agenda of the official government and thereby instigated an environment of social unrest. A rebellion led by former Aristide supporters and current gang leaders soon escalated in the port city of Gonaïves and succeeded, with the help of the state militia, in overthrowing Aristide—for a second time—in 2004.

Immediately after the *coup* the UN authorized the deployment of a Multinational Interim Force, which was soon replaced by MINUSTAH. Designated as a "red zone" (highly dangerous), Bel Air was one of the primary sites of MINUSTAH intervention. Despite these precautions, Aristide's departure instigated a drastic increase in political protest led by the city's lower-class majority in the area. This protest revealed much of the contradictions inherent in Aristide's complex political movement. Initially, it called for Aristide's return, highlighting tensions between poor residents and the wealthy elite as the former used looting, destruction, and kidnapping as retribution for the latter's orchestration of the *coup*. Yet it soon morphed into a "turf war" between rival gangs in Bel Air and also those of other neighborhoods—all of whom claimed allegiance to the former president.

As a result, Bel Air was a target also of the counter-insurgency efforts of the interim government led by former UN-technocrat, Gérard Latorture. It included the arrest and jailing of pro-*Lavalas* supporters (some of whom have only recently been released) as well as the support of efforts by the police and former soldiers to repress and kill them (Council on Hemispheric Affairs 2004). Because a focal point of protest was centered in Bel Air, it became a prime target of these efforts, which were—despite being officially condemned by the UN—executed under the supervision of MINUSTAH. Specifically, in the early period of Latorture's presidency, Bel Air was not only heavily patrolled by MINUSTAH troops and PNH forces. These troops also terrorized the neighborhood in their attempts to destabilize the gangs and

thereby eradicate the various fractions that developed within the *Lavalas* movement. In a string of joint MINUSTAH-PNH raids from September 2004 to January 2005 an estimated four hundred people were killed, several of whom in Bel Air (Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights 2005, Mendonça 2008). As a result of its brutality, this violent clash came to be colloquially known as "Baghdad."

During this time, additional government programs aimed at disintegrating criminal networks, enforcing the remittance of arms, and quieting political unrest also furthered the effort to destabilize the gangs and the *Lavalas* movement in Bel Air. These programs (collectively known as Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion sociale (DDR) and now Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démantèlement et Reinsertion sociale (CNDDR)) promised social services and partial immunity to individuals who gave up their arms. After a series of such violent and nonviolent interventions, the *Lavalas* movement and the terror that characterized its suppression subsided. The successful 2006 democratic election of President Préval, the former Prime Minister to Aristide but now leader of a distinct political coalition, *Fwon Lespwa* (Hope Front), marked a compromise between the anti-Aristide movement executed by the state-MINUSTAH configuration and the continued popular support of the *Lavalas*—if not the Aristide—platform.

With this historical overview, I have attempted to demonstrate how Haitian political history has structured and been structured by the vibrant political and social life in Bel Air.[iii] Specifically, the everyday violence that came to characterize Bel Air during the period of conflict is rooted in the at once predatory and clientalistic history of the state-citizenship relationship in Haiti. Whereas the Duvalier governments were unprecedented in their use of political violence against civil society (Trouillot 1990), the subsequent series of democratic governments marked a different watershed moment in Haiti's longstanding "political economy of trauma" (James 2004). These governments witnessed an exceptional rise in violent crime and political rioting resulting from the conflictive interests of the poor majority and the elite class who represent a global, neoliberal agenda (Dupuy 1997). It is in this context that Viva Rio initially intervened in Bel Air and surrounding areas by working with DDR to promote community awareness.

Bel Air in the Current Political Configuration

Nowhere in Haiti has this political climate been more intense than in the capital of Port-au-Prince. An overwhelming majority of its inhabitants clustered in poor, overcrowded shantytowns, widespread unemployment, a small, wealthy elite residing in nearby suburbs, and the salient concentration and ineptitude of state structures, all converge in the political climate of the capital. As environmental problems of deforestation and soil erosion and international policies of free trade and food aid continue to devastate the peasant economy, Port-au-Prince's population continues to grow rapidly, quadrupling in size since the 1970s. Estimated at nearly three million,[iv] this population is increasingly characterized by a massive underclass. Bel Air, a district located northwest of city center, overlooking from its hilltop setting the *Palais National* and other government edifices below, exemplifies this trend (Figure 1 & 2).

Fig 1. Map of Port-au-Prince with Bel Air Outline



Fig 2. Map of Bel Air with Research Area Outlined[v]



It is officially home to nearly 22,000 people,[vi] though local estimates and a 2007 *Viva Rio* census, which included undocumented households and inhabitants who are "temporarily" residing in the area coalesce around 90,000. Most of this population lacks access to basic necessities, including clean water, sewage and waste treatment, sufficient foodstuffs, and adequate shelter; resides on streets blockaded by piles of garbage; and faces an overwhelming sense of insecurity.

The research that informs this project spans a period of more than two years (July 2007 – October 2009), though the bulk of the research was conducted in the fall of 2009. For Bel Air, this two-year period is defined by the complex political configuration that includes the state government led by President Preval and the ongoing presence of MINUSTAH, together with the growing role of *Viva Rio* in directing development and security projects in the area. In contrast to the period of conflict when everyday life was characterized by violent conflicts between gangs as well as between gangs and the joint, counter-gang operations of MINUSTAH-PNH, this recent period has been marked by a reduction in violent crime and

protest in Bel Air. Often residents of the area highlighted this state of calm in interviews, calling it a "big change" (*gwo chanjman)* and indicating how "neighborhood business is resuming" (*aktivite nan zòn an tounen).* Although this climate intensified in April 2008 when the international rise in the cost of living sparked popular riots contesting the state of mass famine, colloquially termed *klowoks la* (a Creole term which associates hunger pains with the ingestion of Clorox bleach),[vii] the relative calm has promoted a discourse of change both nationally and locally. Nationally, this discourse includes the international call for investment spearheaded by the appointment of former US president Bill Clinton to the newly-created post of UN Special Envoy to Haiti. Locally, it has taken the form of a resident petition, organized by *Viva Rio,* for the UN to switch the area's designation as a "red zone" (highly dangerous) to that of a "green zone," a designation that signifies peace while also highlighting the organization's tree-planting campaign.[viii]

This political climate enabled my research by allowing daily access to the neighborhood. Despite Bel Air's "red zone" status, which prevents UN staff (including those of the *United Nations Development Project* (UNDP)) from entering the area without a military escort, I was able to enter the area on foot every day and conduct research without any threat to my safety. The relative peace also enabled closer relationships with residents who were previously afraid to enter into conversations with foreigners perceived to be tied to MINUSTAH and, as such, could put them in conflict with *baz* in the area. However, while the tremendous change that has occurred in Bel Air cannot be underestimated, the area's near-total unemployment,[ix] vast social inequality, and lack of infrastructure perpetuate a climate of political turmoil and social insecurity.

Method

Two forms of data primarily inform this report. Firstly, six oral histories were conducted. Participants were selected using the snowball method of sampling.[x] My first participant, a figure well-known in the neighborhood as a result of building one of its first cement houses, was introduced to me by a mutual friend. The remaining participants were deemed eligible if, in addition to living in Bel Air for a period of

ten years or more, they resided in the area before the period of conflict and have continued to live there. I interviewed four men and two women, all of whom identified themselves as fifty years old or older. Although lacking formal employment, the women did "work" in petty commerce, selling "whatever can be found" (*sa m kapab jwenn).* Of the four men, one was self-employed as a construction worker, one worked as a school director, and two were unemployed. All of the respondents self-identified as poor, but their quality of life varied. While the two employed men owned their own one-story, three-room houses and sent their children to school—two indicators of middle class status—the remaining respondents relied on friends and family for their housing and nutrition. These respondents highlighted the poor living conditions of their one-room shacks and their inability to obtain access to more than one street-bought meal per day (costing $1.25 (50 HTG)). Although political affiliation was not solicited, all participants acknowledged that they had been ardent supporters of Aristide, while only four admitted to now being so. A majority of respondents had voted for Preval in the 2006 presidential election, though they did not make it known that they were a member of his *Fwon Lespwa* party. None of the participants had voted in the most recent parliamentary elections. No one who was asked to participate refused, nor were any questions or topics refused during the interviews.[xi]

I met twice with each of the participants at their places of residence, conducting a two-hour unstructured interview on each occasion. Both interviews addressed perceptions of two aspects of social life: firstly, neighborhood security, which was taken to denote ideas regarding the safety of one's person, friends, family, and property; secondly, social services, which included six criteria: (1) water; (2) waste and sanitation; (3) health services; (4) schools and education; (5) electricity, (6) food and nutrition. I also noted evaluations of the role of the state, NGOs, and other neighborhood organizations in providing such services. The first interview focused on the thirty-year period dating from the presidencies of François Duvalier and his successor and son, Jean Claude Duvalier (1956-1986), to the 1991 election of Aristide. The second interview focused on the period spanning 1991 to the present, which contains several significant political moments, including (1) the beginning of Aristide's first presidential mandate (February 1991-September 1991); (2) the period of provisionary rule by General Raoul Cédras

(September 1991-October 1994); (3) the completion of Aristide's first mandate (October 1994-February 1996); (4) the five-year term presidency of Préval (1996-2001); (3) the second mandate of Aristide (February 2001-February 2004); (4) the period marked by the interim government of Prime Minister Gerald Latortue and the deployment of MINUSTAH (2004-2006); and finally, (5) the second presidential mandate of Preval (2006-present), operating under MINUSTAH supervision. Evolving out of interviewees' distinctions, these were then grouped in the aforementioned three epochs of the democratic transition, including the Aristide presidencies and those of the provisional governments (1991-2004), the period of conflict (2004-2006), and the contemporary state-MINUSTAH political configuration (2004 to present). For both interviews, I noted perceived changes in how the "government" was seen to interact with the citizenry of Bel Air as it manifested in various forms—from democratic to military rule and from a provisional, internationally sanctioned government to the current state-MINUSTAH political configuration.

Secondly, a mapping exercise was conducted with four focus groups of six to ten participants. Also selected through snowball sampling, the first participants were identified to me by neighborhood residents aware of my research objectives. These individuals then selected other residents who would be able to participate. Unlike the oral history respondents, the focus group participants were not limited to long-term Bel Air residents. An effort was made to establish focus groups that included recent and long-term residents of the area and that represented diverse age groups and both genders.

These groups were randomly divided into two subgroups for the mapping exercise. Each subgroup thus contained men and women of different ages and residential histories. The subgroups were asked to draw a map of Bel Air without any further initial directions. When the groups expressed that they were finished, they were encouraged to add "important neighborhood sites" to the map, which were to be decided among the group. The subgroups were then asked to indicate areas on the map that are "safe zones" (*kote ki gen lape*) and "dangerous areas" (*zòn cho*). When finished, the subgroups were asked to title and sign their map. Finally, the subgroups presented their maps to each other. During the presentations, I asked the participants to elaborate on certain aspects of their maps, eliciting explanations

for their selections of important neighborhood sites and safe and unsafe areas. Like the oral history participants, no one refused to take part in the mapping activity. However, the level of contribution among participants did vary, motivating me to actively encourage the participation of all while mapping and presenting.

I recorded this exercise by taking photographs of the participants as they drew and presented their maps. Throughout the exercise, I followed the participants' discussions, specifically noting the process by which participants formed consensus on how to socially define particular places. I also closely followed participants' reflections on neighborhood social services and security, including differences between the period of conflict (2004-2006) to the relative stabilization of the area today. While discussion centered around the mapping exercise, such insights into pertinent issues of social and political change vis-à-vis the neighborhood supplemented the oral history data.

While these two methods of research yielded much compelling data, it is important to note significant weaknesses. Firstly, the small scale of the study demands that the findings be seen as preliminary in nature. While the focus on in-depth, semi-structured oral histories enabled the crafting of fuller historical narratives, it also necessarily limited the quantity of respondents. Secondly, the scope of the research objectives, which focused on tracking changes in perceptions in relation to a history of political configurations, did not allow for analysis of differences across other, potentially significant differences, such as age, gender, political affiliation, etc. Any indication that such factors influenced differences in responses may not be utilized as conclusions of this study, but rather as hypotheses for further study. Thirdly, the use of snowball sampling limited the study to particular respondents, which may have restricted conflict and debate. To explain, because snowball sampling acts through a referral structure, it selects respondents who are within a social network. As such, it tends to select for individuals of similar persuasions. It also tends to select for individuals who view the research favorably. Especially in conflict-ridden settings with a history of mistrust of both foreigners and of foreign-sponsored research, this method tends to overestimate consensus where there is, in fact, controversy. Further study, which employs a diversity of sampling techniques, is thus necessary to substantiate the following results.

Findings

Perceiving Security: From Certain, Consolidated Power to Undefined, Dispersed Power

From the Duvalier dictatorships to the present political configuration of the Haitian state operating under the supervision of MINUSTAH, Bel Air residents articulate a shift in their perceptions of how sovereign power in Haiti operates, and particularly, how this power secures the safety of their person, friends, family, and property. Interestingly, sovereign power is articulated as consolidated in the hands of a particular person and his "clients" during not only not only the Duvalier dictatorships, but also the Aristide presidencies of the democratic transition. This power is further identified as "certain"—that is, those who held power were recognizable and, as such, supporting their governments meant avoiding political violence. Of Aristide, Loique,[xii] a sixty-year-old director of a community school said during our first oral history meeting,

> There was protection inside the neighborhood because it was an area for Aristide. If you are with him, you had no problem. The area was united [literally, 'heads together'] before 2004 There were not criminals really, even though they called them criminals. Because we were from the area, they [the criminals] never stopped us from doing anything.
>
> *Te genyen pwoteksyon andan zòn nan paske se te yon zòn pou Aristid. Si ou te avèk li, ou pa t gen pwoblèm…Zòn nan te genyen tèt ansanm avan 2004. Pa t gen bandi vreman vre, menm si yo te rele yo bandi. Paske nou te moun zòn nan, yo pa t jamn anpeche nou fè sa nou gen pou nou fè a.*

However, like the practice during the Duvalier period of using the identification of "communist" as a stand-in for nonpartisans in order to politically justify their violent repression, residents expressed that, while Aristide rhetorically targeted the elite class (*boujwa*) in his public discourse, "criminal" (*volè*) became a stand-in for nonpartisans of Aristide in Bel Air. This was cited in reference to Aristide's "zero tolerance" policy through which many Bel Air residents were informally employed to police the neighborhood, which often entailed violently attacking and killing supposed criminals. Continuing, Loique stated:

> People would call others 'criminals' to get rid of those who were not for him [Aristide]. But, it was not all who were criminals. It was like that under 'zero tolerance'.

> *Moun konn rele moun 'vole' pou jete moun ki pa t pou li. Men, se pa tout ki te volè. Se te komsa sou zewo tolerans.*

Yet despite this observation, residents noted an improvement in neighborhood security under Aristide, which was directly attributed to the vast employment of young men in different sectors of the government administration. During our first oral history meeting, Sam, a thirty-year-old unemployed man stated,

> Aristide made a lot of changes for this area. He put poor people in his administration. He gave people hope that they will earn their daily bread. He put them in Teleco, ONA, APN (the national phone company, office for old-age insurance (*Office Nationale Assurance vieillesse)*, and national port authority (*Autorité Portuaire Nationale*), respectively) but they did not really work.
>
> *Aristid te fè chanjman pou zòn nan. Li te mete pòv yo nan administrasyon. Li te bay moun espwa y ap jwenn pen kwotidiyèn. Li te mete yo nan Teleco, OPN, APN, men yo pa t travay vreman.*

A young man in his mid-twenties who was listening to our conversation, clarified the logic motivating this relationship. He stated,

> If you have two hundred people who get up every morning and go after fifty Haitian *gourdes*, that is two hundred less people who are no longer into petty crime.
>
> *Si ou genyen de san moun ki leve pou al deyè sank san goud chak maten, se de san moun ki pa nan vagabondaj ankò.*

The observed direct relationship between security and work was carried over to reflections on the contemporary period as well. When specifically asked whether and how another "Baghdad" could be avoided, respondents continually stressed the importance of work. "There is not enough work," "too much unemployment," "nothing to do," and "no opportunity to take care of your needs" were the standard answers for why the level of insecurity remains elevated and why the neighborhood could "explode" (*eklate*) again. Yet, despite the recognition of a high level of insecurity, another Baghdad seemed improbable in the minds of the respondents. Their reasoning was based on three distinctions: the kind of insecurity, where it is now located, and from whom it originates.

Firstly, when identifying "red zones" on their maps of Bel Air, focus group respondents articulated current insecurity as a susceptibility to petty thievery and located it in specific spaces, namely the market places and the bus and train stations of the area (see Appendix, Figure 3, "red zones" are marked by red

circles). This observation was markedly different from oral history respondents' reflections on the two earlier periods of Duvalier and Aristide, which stressed a general susceptibility to the terror of political violence. While still stressing a general susceptibility, current observations articulated this to result from the sense of being directly or indirectly victimized by the violence manifesting in the undefined area of the "street." Secondly, when asked about the causes of such insecurity, oral history respondents noted that today insecurity could not be attributed to a single leader and the complex network of a government administration. This was in marked contrast to these residents' certainty in the causes of their susceptibility to violence during earlier periods, though not the period of conflict. Like the experience of safety that arose from being "with Aristide," as Loique stated, the Duvalier dictatorships manifested a degree of security not only from their "strong-arm" tactics of repression, but also from maintaining a monopoly on violence. This was seen as preferable to the dispersed violence of today. To explain, when power is not perceived as hierarchical, all residents are taken to be as empowered and thus violence could potentially emanate from anyone. As one of the oral history respondents, Joel, a sixty-five-year-old carpenter who has lived his whole life in Bel Air, stated,

> People say that the street was not dirty during Duvalier, there were not petty thieves, and that's true, because people could not move at all. That was because only one person had power. Now, you have too many people who have too much liberty. Democracy is good, but the way it is done here and now, they take it as total liberty.
>
> *Moun di pa t gen lari a sal pandan Duvalier, pa t gen ti volè, epi se vre, paske moun pa t ka bouji menm menm menm. Se te paske yon sèl moun te gen pouvwa. Kounye a la ou gen twòp moun ki gen twòp libète. Demokrasi bon, men jan li fèt kounye a la, yo ran li kom yon libète nèt.*

Despite such criticisms, the oral history and focus group respondents agreed that there has been a drastic improvement in neighborhood security during the past three years as compared to the period of conflict and its aftermath. During the period of conflict, the neighborhood was almost completely taken over by violence, forcing the majority of residents to locate to other areas and imprisoning others in their houses. During our second oral history meeting, one fifty-year-old woman described this state of affairs,

> They [MINUSTAH/the police] used to make us stay inside. They [the insurgents] would shoot us…even our heads, they could tell us to not put it outside. We sat there all day every day. We sat

> there in the middle of the room. If you were hungry, you stayed hungry. You could not even go to the toilet. They said 'Do not dare go outside.' Do not even put out your neck.
>
> Yo te konn fè pou nou rete andan… Yo t ap tire nou…menm tèt nou yo konn di nou pa mete l deyò. Nou te chita la nan mitan pyès la. Si ou te grangou, ou te rete grangou. Yo di 'Pinga nou sòti, pa lonje kou n.'

Now, in contrast, the neighborhood is an active and vibrant place. During my daily visits to Bel Air, market women noted how they have been able to return to their daily activities, which entail being on the street both before sunrise and after sunset. Young men noted how they were able to engage in street life, chatting with friends, playing dominos, watching the "activity" (*aktivite*), and even occasionally attending neighborhood concerts and festivals well into the evening. Young women noted how they are able to walk their children to school, attend church, and also chat and even "go out" (*sòti*) with friends and neighbors. Children mentioned how street soccer and basketball games are again played in the streets. Indeed, I observed an active street life in Bel Air during the day and often till the late hours of the evening, with residents sitting and chatting on the many constructed benches and public places that mark the area's plethora of *baz—*which include musical groups, organizations, and "staff" (formalized cliques). Such drastic changes in the lives of residents were attributed alternatively to MINUSTAH, to the work with the state (namely, the National Police and CNDDR) in cooperation with MINUSTAH, and to both of these entities' collaborations with international organizations such as *Viva Rio* and several local political, social, and cultural organizations of which Bel Air numbers at least fifty.[xiii] Indeed, although many respondents noted disapproval of the current state-MINUSTAH configuration's ability to respond to residents' basic needs, an approval was noted in the government's handling of security and policing. This was reflected in a sense that the neighborhood is continually under supervision, as noted by the UN helicopter drawn on one focus group's map (See Appendix, Figure 2). It was also reflected in their assessments of the government. For example, when asked about how he viewed the work of the current government, Joel offered,

> Security is the only thing that Preval did…he has had the chance to form a lot of police…put a good guy in as Police Chief…there are no longer criminals inside the police…this was a huge little step…and then we now have a bit of relief here, it's no joke.

> Sekerite se sèl bagay Preval fè…li gen tan fòme anpil polis…mete bon moun chef lapolis…pa gen vagabon andan lapolis ankò…se te yon gwo ti bagay…epi nou genyen yon ti souf isi a, se pa jwèt.

Yet, this statement must be viewed in light of the fact that several respondents, while noting the several forces that have led to this amelioration, were frustrated that security now seems to be the purview of a multitude of governing entities. Moreover, they noted that in the event of a problem concerning security, they simply did not know where to go—to the nearby MINUSTAH base of *Fort National*, to the nearest police precinct, to the number of "community leaders" working with CNDDR, MINUSTAH, and *Viva Rio* in the neighborhood, or to their zone's "*gran nèg*" or "*notab*" (the influential, authoritative, and indeed, often feared residents). In fact, respondents noted how residents often request the leaders of local organizations—especially, those of the prominent *Sektè Popilè Belè* (Public Sector of Bel Air)—to mediate disputes, engage in street surveillance, or otherwise "protect" (*pwoteje*) the neighborhood. This frustration was most palpable in respondents' descriptions of their experience as that of living in a stateless or anarchic society. At a community school in Bel Air, Sam raised his voice and slammed his wrist down on the unstable school bench on which we sat, telling me,

> This is a country that runs without a state, without government, everyone defends themselves, defends their own wallet, their own wife and children, but there is no one who defends the country.

> Se yon peyi k ap jire san leta, san gouvenmen, tout moun defan yo menm, defan poch yo, madam, petit yo, pa gen moun ki defan peyi a.

Though gestured toward by others, this response encapsulated a critical shift in the perceptions of security among Bel Air residents. This shift is defined by a change from the social experience of living with a certainty of who exercises power to one where power is uncertain and not localizable. I argue that this change is rooted in the simultaneous shift from recognizing the state as the sovereign authority on matters of security to an inability to recognize who of the current, complex configuration of power is the authority. While notable improvements in security have been observed, perceptions of interacting in everyday life with an indefinable power structure has produced a sense of insecurity that continues to haunt the population of Bel Air.

Perceiving Social Services: From One-Provider Clientelism to Several-Provider Clientelism

Like perceptions of security, perceptions of other basic social services are structured by the existing political configuration. Therefore, a similar trend is present among the responses of Bel Air residents when asked about the availability and access of such services, including water, waste and sanitation, heath services, schools and education, electricity, and food and nutrition. Yet rather than emphasizing degrees of certainty of political power, this trend reveals another aspect of political power, namely, the form of political power in Haiti. Specifically, it depicts an evolution within the rather constant perception of government in Haiti as one that operates through patron-client relations. Termed "clientelism," this system, often used to refer to governments of developing countries, has been most often characterized by the "use of institutions of the state for private gain rather than for the public good" (Dupuy 2007, 96). While this may be true, what is most important to note is that such a system is perceived as working in the service of select clients who are required to adopt certain ideas and behaviors in order to gain access to the designation of "client." While an articulation of this intricate process of client initiation is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that Bel Air residents perceive a change from client as partisan to one of client as associate. This change indicates that whereas the form of clientelism that operated under the Duvalier dictatorships projected an image that attainment of service was contingent on party membership, the image currently projected is that attainment of service—if it is even perceived to exist—is contingent on becoming an associate of a social organization. For Bel Air, such an organization is alternately cast as a powerful international organization working in the area or a local organization, which solicits not only the national ministries, but also national and international NGOs to finance social projects.

Although nostalgia for the Duvalier dictatorships has become commonplace throughout the capital—typified by the refrain "not under Duvalier" as one steps over piles of garbage or puddles of trash-filled water, oral history respondents claimed that these dictatorships initiated the form of clientelism that now plaques the country. They noted that the Duvalier dictatorships fabricated the differentiation between the deserving and undeserving citizen that continues to divide the poor residents of Bel Air. Demonstrating

these two categories of citizenship, Frankétienne, a notable author and painter who was raised in Bel Air but now lives in a neighboring suburb, told me,

> Under the hygiene plan, and health, because almost every hygiene service, when Duvalier came to power you begin to have some problems…the things were no longer for everyone but for the *tonton* and the friends of *tonton*.
>
> *Sou plan ijenik epi sante, preske tout sèvis ijenik, lè Duvalier vin monte pouvwa ou vin gen pwoblèm,..bagay sa yo pa t pou tout moun ankò. Yo te pou tonton yo e zanmi tonton yo.*

In this way, the form of political violence that operated under Duvalier was not seen as confined to the violent repression of dissenters, but inclusive of the political favors that were dispensed in the form of cash as well as preferential access to basic social services. While acknowledging the identification of the *tonton* for particular individuals, respondents also identified the neighborhood of Bel Air as ineligible for many of the services extended to other areas because it was seen as anti-Duvalier. Joel illustrated this phenomenon with an example of how the public school named after Daniel Fignolé came to be built in Bel Air under Jean Claude Duvalier only after much pressure from neighborhood protests. "The only thing Duvalier did for Bel Air, and we had to force it,"[xiv] this school was repeatedly used to emphasize Bel Air's lack of service during the thirty years of Duvalier rule.

Under Aristide, a similar form of clientelism was observed, but, as opposed to the Duvalier period, it was seen to serve the interests of those in Bel Air. Using phrases such as, "he took care of us" (*li te pran swen nou*), "he did not leave us" (*li pa t lage nou*), or "he worked for us" (*li te travay pou nou)*, oral history respondents depicted a paternal relationship between Aristide and his clients. Not strictly animated by those formally attached to the administration (as the *tonton* were to Duvalier), this relationship extended beyond individuals to also include the "neighborhood" and even to include the general class status of "poor people" (*malerè*, *moun pòv, or often, moun nan mizè*). On the one hand, respondents expressed a general improvement in the social services offered in the neighborhood. On the other hand, they emphasized how the employment that Aristide provided in different sectors of the government enabled residents to afford other social services, namely schooling for their children. For both cases, respondents noted how the selective delivery of services to Bel Air residents echoed the patron-client

relations of Duvalier. Yet, crucially, this system was seen to be "good" (*bon,* meaning morally right and politically legitimate) not merely because it was benefiting them—though this is certainly part of it—but also because it was contributing to a system of wealth redistribution. Joel continued,

> It is the same with Aristide…there was a lot of corruption…he employed a lot of people but they did not really work…a lot of people got money…he gave them training…it is that that caused the most chaos in the *coup*....becasue they really found a living…they found work, but it was not only that…he gave food, brought the Cuban doctors, built schools, hospitals. He did positive things with the money even though he took it from the national treasury.
>
> *Se menm jan ak Aristid…te genyen anpil koripsyon…li vin anplwaye anpil moun men yo pa t travay vreman…anpil moun te jwenn kòb…li bay yo fòmasayon…se sa ki fè plis dezòd nan koudeta…paske yo te vreman jwenn lavi…yo te jwenn travay, men se pa selman sa…li te bay manje, mete doktè Kiban yo, bati lekòl, opital…li te fè bagay positif ak kòb la menm si li prann li nan men trezò piblik.*

Likewise, Sam, while reiterating the importance of work, stressed how there was a sense that the administration was concerned with, and thus, would respond to the complaints of Bel Air residents. He explained,

> The things worked a little bit easier. He came to Bel Air. The health center worked well, even the General Hospital, and then there was a lot of work. That made people able to send their children to school. There was garbage in the street but if you said there is garbage near you, there would be someone who would come with the truck. They responded to the needs of the population.
>
> *Bagay yo te mache yon ti jan pi fasil. Li te vin Belè. Sant sante a te byen fonktinye menm opital jeneral epi te genyen anpil travay. Sa fè moun ka voye peti yo lekòl. Te genyen fatra nan lari men si ou di nou gen fatra bò kote nou te genyen yon moun ki t ap vin pran li ak machin nan. Yo te reponn ak bezwen popilasyon nan.*

In addition to individual employment, a crucial component of this perceived system of wealth distribution was the formation, development, and utilization of local organizations in the neighborhood. Instilling a sense of Aristide's understanding and willingness to help, this effort included the channeling of funds, in the form of, among others, cash, foodstuffs, scholarly materials, and clothing, to local organizations who were then expected to distribute their "gifts" to members and deserving residents. Fanfan, a fifty-year-old unemployed man who previously directed a local *Lavalas*-affilitated political organization that is now struggling to attract members, stated,

> …From the first time Aristide came to power in the country…there were people who worked…and they used to give organizations some money here and there. We could find a little something in that to do all we have for us to do.

> *…Depi premye fwa li [Aristid] te monte pouvwa nan peyi a…te gen moun ki te travay…epi yo konn voye ba òganizasyon ti kòb de tanzatan. Nou konn jwenn yon ti bagay nan sa pou fè tout sa nou gen pou nou fè.*

Pauline, a fifty-year-old woman who has lived her entire life in Bel Air, raising six children, one of which died during the period of conflict, reiterated this effort by depicting the network of organizations as both an insurer for difficult times and a creditor for future ambitions. At our second oral history meeting, she explained,

> He made an organization with each person who came, they did things like left money if someone was sick for them to find. If there was a person who went to sell things, they lent her money from the (organization's) money to go sell.
>
> *Li te fè òrganizasyon a chak moun ki vini, yo fè bagay mete kòb lè moun malad pou yo jwenn. Si gen moun ki pral fè komès yo prete l nan kòb la al fè komès.*

Having left an indelible impression, this form of organizing in an effort to attract attention and resources—as well as develop a pathway for their reception—has remained a critical component of political life in Bel Air. While most of the organizations who flourished under Aristide, like that of Fanfan, have waned, a new wave of political, social, and cultural organizations have developed. Deriving from *baz,* these organizations are mostly directed by small groups of young men who have as their stated objective the execution of local social projects. Ranging from the celebration of *Carnival*, national holidays, and neighborhood festivals to the distribution of foodstuffs or scholarly materials, such organizations are regularly soliciting various government ministries as well as the several international organizations working in Haiti, counting, most markedly, *Viva Rio*. When laying out the "important sites" of Bel Air on their maps, many of the focus groups specifically noted the location of such organizations, attesting to their significance for neighborhood affairs (see Appendix, Figure 4 for the notation of *baz*).

Yet, in contrast to previous organization's role as facilitators of distribution to the political base of Aristide's administration (which includes Preval's first mandate), today's organizations are integrated into several different facets of the current government. Dependent on financing from national ministries, NGOs, and the contributions of neighborhood residents, especially *gran nèg* or *notab,* in addition to

particular *dyaspora,* these organizations are not clearly positioned within a hierarchical power structure. Whereas the state could be said to work through the former generation of organizations, these organizations might be better characterized as engaging in their own form of "state-making," a form that is underwritten by diverse sources of income within the complexity of the state-MINUSTAH political configuration. As many have told me, *nou fè leta* (We make the state).

However, despite the overwhelming quantity of such organizations, oral history respondents did not claim that they respond to or satisfy their needs to a similar degree as the organizations of the democratic transition. Most, while acknowledging their presence in the neighborhood, depicted these organizations as servicing the select group of people—who I have termed "associates"—who comprise their *baz.* Loique explained, "everything such as this helps some residents, but not all. We don't have a state right now…it's a small group who gives us service but it's not good."[xv] The focus group respondents reiterated this sentiment by depicting each *baz* as limited to a specific area of the neighborhood and taking the time to accentuate these boundaries by marking them with distinct colors or symbols. Beyond their limited scope, one of the major reasons for such devaluing of the work of organizations was that monies allocated for projects were seen to be squandered by the associates. Echoing Loique, Joel stated,

> It is from Aristide that people have a lot, a lot of organizations. Now it's these small organizations who say they will respond to our needs…do a community restaurant, collect the garbage, start a small school, but it is not them who really do it. If they get 100,000 Haitian dollars ($12,500 US) from the state or an NGO they separate it amongst themselves. What is even more serious is that they don't separate the money among all their members but between a few people within it.
>
> *Se apati Aristid moun fè anpil anpil òganisasyon. Kounye a la se ti òganizazyon ki di y ap reponn ak bezwen nou…fè yon kanteen, ranmase fatra, fè yon ti lekòl, men se pa sa yo fè vreman. Si yo vin jwenn 100mil dola nan men leta ou nan men yon ONG se separe ant yo menm yo fè. Sa ki pi rèd se yo pa menm separe l ak tout manb òganizasyon an, men ant kèk moun ladan.*

Moreover, although respondents acknowledged the assistance of local groups in development work (mainly in the form of labor), many were quick to attribute the initiatives to those organizing and financing the projects, such as MINUSTAH, *Viva Rio,* or other international organizations. Specifically, while a number of local organizations collaborated with *Viva Rio* on their project to augment the quantity of water available to residents by refurbishing old and building new "water kiosks," Loique only

acknowledged *Viava Rio*'s role, despite being asked about the role of nearby organizations. In a similar vein, he continued,

> …and for garbage it is the same foreigners who came with the program. It is MINUSTAH who has done this for two weeks…They pick up the garbage with some people from the area.
>
> *Epi pou fatra se menm blan yo ki vin ak pwogram. Se MINUSTAH ki fè sa depi de semen. Yo ranmase fatra ak kèk moun zòn nan.*

Previously viewed as part of one administration, the state and local organizations have been usurped by international organizations in their delivery of social services during the contemporary period. However, this is not to say that respondents expressed satisfaction with the work of such international organizations. While clearly appreciating the advancements that have been made in water access and trash collection—the two central initiatives of *Viva Rio*—respondents were critical of the piecemeal nature of projects. They saw these initiatives, which target specific needs and specific areas, as failing to address the general lack of infrastructure that impedes all social services for the entire area. When faced with limited access to adequate shelter and food, education, health services, electricity, etc., significant interventions in the areas of water and waste and sanitation seem less so. Yet, apart from electricity, respondents seemed to position "work" as the bedrock of ensuring their access to other social services. During our first oral history meeting, Yvonne, a middle-aged woman who relocated to Bel Air at age three and has spent her whole life in the area, said it best when she noted,

> A lot of young men, they have wives, they have children, they cannot find work for them to do…a little job…this could happen…but there are no leaders/directors, people who can direct the country don't cast their eyes on it. If we had work, we would not need all of this aid from foreigners. We would not even need to send our children overseas. We could pay for school. We could make food everyday.[xvi] Build nice houses. We could live. You see what I am saying, *we could live*.
>
> *Yon pakèt jenn gason la, yo gen madam, yo gen peti, yo pa ka jwenn yon travay pou yo fè…yon ti djob, sa ka rive, men pa gen dirijan, moun k ap dirije peyi a pa voye je gade yo. Si nou te genyen travay, nou pa t bezwen tout ed ki sòt nan men etranje yo. Nou pa t menm bezwen voye timoun nou lòt bò dlo. Nou ta ka peye lekòl. Nou ta ka fè manje chak jou. Bati bèl kay. Nou ta ka viv. Ou wè sa m di, nou ta ka viv.*

Embedded in this insistence on "work" is a critique of how the current political configuration services the needs of the citizenry. As articulated by this study's respondents, residents seem particularly unsatisfied with the move away from a form of clientelism that was rooted in a central power to a form that contains many diverse networks of governing patrons and their citizen clients. Indeed, a call for a state that responds to their needs is the reason motivating much of the nostalgia for Aristide that continues to dominate Bel Air. However, to recognize this fact is not to claim that residents were not mindful of the weaknesses of even this form of clientelism, which was seen as unable to develop the single paternal relationship between state and citizenry that is so redeemed among Bel Air residents.

Conclusion

In tracing Bel Air residents' perceptions of security and social services as they have developed through Haiti's recent political history, this report has indicated that such perceptions are inextricably tied to perceptions and evaluations of government. Significantly, this report has shown that as government shifted from being epitomized by a consolidated and certain power to one of a dispersed and deferred nature, citizens perceived a simultaneous change in their sense of security and in their access to social services. On the one hand, residents have moved from perceiving a single sovereign threat to their security to perceiving a generalized threat from the masses of young men bedeviled by a grave situation of hunger and joblessness. On the other, they have moved from perceiving their wellbeing as dictated by the administration of a single leader to one handled by a number of divergent governing mechanisms, including state ministries and neighborhood and international organizations. In conclusion, this report has demonstrated that these complimentary shifts cannot be understood without fully understanding the ways in which government is constructed in the minds of those it is intended to serve.

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Appendix 1

Figure 1: Generated Bel Air Map 1

Figure 2: Generated Bel Air Map 2

Figure 3: Generated Bel Air Map 3

Figure 4: Generated Bel Air Map 4

Figure 5: Mapping-In-Action 1

Figure 6: Mapping-In-Action 2

Figure 7: Mapping-In-Action 3

Figure 8: Mapping-In-Action 4

Figure 8: Viva Rio Project and Census Area* (White = Project Area; Red = Census Area)

*Courtesy of Viva Rio, 2007

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[i] Most notably, *Viva Rio* conducted a census in 2007 in Bel Air as part of its development of a water distribution program in the area. See Maternowski (2006) for a discussion of the importance of census work for NGOs.
[ii] Clearly influenced by the social system of slavery, this caste-like system has political roots that date from the time General Touissant L'Ouverture, the renowned, free black revolutionary leader, ordered in 1801—three years before Haiti would achieve independence—former slaves (then soldiers), to return to the plantations and placed a mulatto and free black class in governmental and military posts.
[iii] For further reading on the history of Bel Air residents involvement in political history, see Jean-Jacques 1948.
[iv] The Institut Haitien de Statistique et d'Informatique (IHSI): 4ème Recensement Général de la Population et l'Habitat, August 2003, records a population of 1,977,036. The inclusion of unofficial residents, estimated to be at least 1,000,000, raises the figure to nearly 3,000,000 persons in the metropolitan area. This figure is extremely difficult assess as migration to the capital has been occurring at a rapid rate since the mid-80s when it was estimated to be 30, 000/year (Dupuy 2007).
[v] This report is limited to a narrower area than the project area of Viva Rio, which includes surrounding neighborhoods of Bel Air. For a map of this area, please see Appendix Figure 7.
[vi] Data gathered on July 29, 2008 from the IHSI: 4ème Recensement Général de la Population et l'Habitat, August 2003. Estimate based on the official figure of 21,313.
[vii] Rioters throughout Haiti, but especially in the capital, violently targeted MINUSTAH for its presumed role in the food crisis, shooting to death one off-duty Nigerian peacekeeper on a main thoroughfare of the Bel Air neighborhood. (See "Un Casque bleu tué, des étalages incendiés," *Le Nouvelliste,* April 14, 2008.) The riots resulted in the ousting of Prime Minister Jacques-Édouard Alexis later that month, who had been cast by several local populist organizations as a champion of the neoliberal policies that have led to a loss of Haitian food and state sovereignty. The high cost of living (*lavi a chè* in Creole) in Haiti remains a crucial issue in the daily lives of Bel Air residents, simultaneously provoking widespread famine and aggression.
[viii] "Du Rouge au Vert," *Le Nouvelliste*, July 29, 2009.
[ix] In a 2007 Census conducted by *Viva Rio,* 67% of respondents claimed to work: however, only 17% of respondents were engaged in formal employment (6% employed as public servants and 11% employed by private enterprise). My own research indicates that the vast majority of Bel Air residents who claim to work are self-employed in informal commerce or service occupations.
[x] For a detailed explanation of snowball sampling and a review of its benefits for topics addressing sensitive topics and populations, see Brown (2005).
[xi] Many respondents did, however, respond "I don't know" (*M pa konnen)* to particular questions, which often asks as a polite substitute for a refusal. This was especially noted when respondents were asked about the period of conflict. Several were reluctant to offer an explanation of the causes of this violence or to reflect on their daily lives during this time. I hypothesize that this is a result of an ongoing fear of being targeted by those (on either side of the conflict) who perpetuated the violence.
[xii] In order to protect the identities of respondents, all names have been changed. However, other personal characteristics, such as age and occupation, are accurate.
[xiii] Insert calculations on organizations
[xiv] In Creole, "*sèl bagay li fè pou Belè epi nou te fòse l.*"
[xv] In Creole, "*Tout bagay sa yo ede kèk abitan nan zòn nan, men pa tout…Nou pa gen leta kounye a la…se ti gwoup moun ki ba nou sèvis men li pa bon.*"
[xvi] The ability to make food, as opposed to buying ready-made food in the street, is a sign of wealth in Haiti, as the costs of buying and preparing food are relatively high.