Medellín's Challenges Continue

INTERNVIEW/Iván Darío Ramírez

After registering a murder rate of 381 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1991 (three times the current homicide rate in Ciudad Juarez, the most violent in the world today, according to Institute for International Studies) Medellin managed to dramatically turn itself around through social investment and a recovery program backed by the national government: by 2004 the city reached a historically low homicide rate of 24 per 100,000 inhabitants', according to Colombia's Institute of Forensic Medicine.

"Mega-libraries" and teleféricos in underserved neighborhoods, and investment in culture, recreation and sports became icons of the "Medellin Model". But a spike in violence rates in recent years—80 children have been killed by gunfire in 2011 and the homicide rate rose to 45 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010—has revived fears that violence could return to the levels of two decades ago.

Sociologist Ivan Ramirez, coordinator of the Observatory on Children in Armed Conflict and Organized Armed Violence, part of the Peace and Democracy Corporation, offers his view of the city's current situation, discusses the achievements and failures of the "Medellin Model" introduced by mayors Sergio Fajardo and Alonso Salazar, and draws attention to the importance of strengthening social investment to avoid setbacks in security, progress and democracy in the industrial city in western Colombia.

Much is said about the success of the model implemented by Sergio Fajardo and Alonso Salazar's administrations, but recently there is talk about a backslide in security in Medellin. How are things today?

The history of Medellín can be divided between before and after the Citizen Engagement Project, which was led by Sergio Fajardo and continues today with Alonso Salazar. The two governments made a major breakthrough by implementing this project, which seeks to give more transparency to the city's resources and how they are spent toward social programs.

In my opinion, this strategy was based on the fact that the city (not just for security reasons but for the way it was administrated) was devoid of the conditions that could make it internationally competitive, which was in the interests of many sectors of the city. These two administrations aimed to improve a few indicators to make the city more competitive, and social investment was a means to do so. That has its advantages and disadvantages in the sense that the primary interest is in capital instead of in people. But we must recognize that this was a break from previous models and it did show greater concern for the rights of individuals.

How can the this new model be observed today?

There has been an improvedin quality of life in areas as diverse as: investment in infrastructure, transportation (metro-cables), access to education, kindergartens, libraries and recreational and cultural activities. You can see art and activities happening in the barrios. Artists themselves recognize that there has been improved investment in cultural projects. It's still not enough, but it's better than before.

But the city is more or less safe?


That issue has always been controversial. The Citizens Engagement project coinciding with the first demobilization of paramilitary groups. You could say that the Medellin government took a gamble by investing in a process of social reintegration, using human and financial resources. I agree with the critique of Citizen Engagement that the federal government didn't offer enough support. But also to blame was the fact that, that the investment was not accompanied by a local process of oversight and monitoring that was serious enough to ensure that the paramilitaries and drug traffickers couldn't reenter the scene. It also ignored the need to incorporate critical issues like drug trafficking in the city, and the full dismantling of paramilitary structures and their associations with organized armed violence, in the process.

I say it has been a controversial subject because there is a contradiction among those who argue that improved levels of security and especially lowered homicide rates that occurred mainly in the first administration were a result of the policy of reintegration. But there is another point of view that says: that has been a sort of pact—tacit or not—where, after demobilization, one armed group set up hegemonic control and maintained a sense of calm. That is to say, the city being at peace  served both the establishment, but also served criminal organizations because they are not being pursued.

Now, experience shows that the city erred in failing to recognize the magnitude and complexity of the problem. This is why we say there were paramilitaries who were demobilized but not disarmed and there were disarmed paramilitaries who not demobilized. That is, individuals and groups exercised a reckless control in many parts of the city. In addition, local and national governments have acknowledged that there was a substantial group of former criminals who returned to crime, armed themselves, and incorporated themselves into criminal groups (even citizens who hadn't previously been part of these groups) to reap the benefits that the new system offers criminals.

So do most people believe the second scenario that the improvement in safety was due to a tacit non-aggression pact between the establishment and criminals?


Analysts of the urban phenomenon in Medellin agree that this was an important factor, and the proof is what we have today in the city: one group that can be called neo-paramilitaries, who have learned from the experience of the paramilitaries. Talk of a deal is complex, but we can note that there was some laxity and tolerance when there could have been a more comprehensive response to the problem. Take for example, the responses to cases in which human rights leaders have been threatened and even killed. But the most obvious fact is the existence of territorial control that still exists and is expressed under these new ways.

How does this manifest itself in the city?

Structures that we call organized armed violence do not necessarily have counterinsurgency interests, but rather economic interests for which they use paramilitary to affect the state. This is not only linked to drug trafficking but with other illicit economies, territory control, manifested as neo-paramilitaries, with a clear focus on attacking human rights defenders and social leaders. Also on the rise in the last two years are homicide rates and the extensive recruitment of children and adolescents to these armed groups.

So in terms of security, is the city is worse than before?

Sectors of the opposition and human rights advocates complain that the demobilization process was a lot of show. In the process of reintegration, illegal armed groups took advantage of the program and were able to recreate some of their own structures. Researchers and critics have complained that there is now "gangster" or "illegal" powers in the city, which are not only drug traffickers, but also those interested in the state. The homicide figures in 2008 had dropped to 30 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and today we have nearly 100 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

Who are these groups that currently threaten security in Medellin?

These are groups that have come back from previous processes, middle guys from the demobilization of 2003. These remnants have begun new disputes over territories and internal markets. However, the city struggles to define or acknowledge the existence of these armed groups, which are manifestations of paramilitary structures.
According to some researchers, these structures have an economic project, an interest in seeking state and territorial control. They attack human rights operate through corruption, extortion and intimidation. On the other hand, the government insists that criminal structures have no interest in controlling territories. We believe that these sectors have an interest in capturing the state, as in cities in Italy and elsewhere in the world.

How does the territory dispute between these groups manifest itself?


More and more children are being recruited to work with these criminal practices (for the transport of drugs, trafficking, sexual exploitation, etc.). Today, many schools in Medellin are in disputed territories, and armed groups have not only attacked the school but have permeated the school from their criminal interests.
In Colombia, in addition to political violence, school are exploited by illegal armed actors who have economic interests, in selling drugs, using of girls for sexual exploitation, circulating guns. Armed criminals intimidate school authorities. Teachers threatened, and children frightened, and this has a strong impact on schooling.

What figures illustrate the victimization of children and youth in Medellin?


In 2009, 12 students were killed in Medellin. In 2000, when the homicide rate was 167 per 100,000 inhabitants, a child was killed every 4.8 days. In 2009, a child was killed every three days. In 2010, every 1.8 days, and February 2011, a child died by gunfire almost every day in the city. That is, between January and February 2011, 58 children under 18 were killed, according to the National Institute of Legal Medicine. In the past 18 months, 5 young hip-hop artists were killed Comuna 13.

We need to wake up. If children dying every day here doesn't phase us, then what will ?

Translated by Danielle Renwick

Photo: Iván Ramírez

More information:

Medellín cómo vamos

Alcaldía de Medellín

Instituto Popular de Capacitación