Plan Colombia re-examined, facts and figures

INTERVIEW/Daniel Mejía Londoño

According to the most recent UN 2009 World Drugs Report, in the period from 2007 to 2008, cocaine crops shrunk in 18% and cocaine production fell 28%. Once more the question comes up, is Plan Colombia successful or not? This is a plan that has the United Status and Colombia, combined, invest 2.6 billion dollars a year since the year 2000.

Two researchers from Colombia’s Universidad de los Andes asked that very question in the study “The War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking: An Economic Evaluation of Plan Colombia”, published prior to the latest UN report.

Daniel Mejía, PhD from Brown University is one of the authors of the study along with Pascual Restrepo. Mejía notes that Plan Colombia has had little success in lowering the influx of cocaine to the United States, but it has been successful in improving security in Colombia.

What does the data have to say?

Mejía gave Comunidad Segura an exclusive interview in which he explains the methodology and the most important findings of this study based on data available from 2000 to 2006. The data points to a general trend in cocaine supplies that is also reflected in the latest UN Report. He also contrasts the efficiency of targeting production versus concentrating on intercepting cocaine delivery routes. In his words, the facts and figures:

Does the latest UN World Drugs Report show positive or negative results for Colombia?

We could say that results are positive for Colombia. However, we still need to find out if the patterns of pricing and demand are in keeping with UNODC estimates and with ONDCP estimates (the United States’ Office of National Drug Control Policy).To my mind, these results must not be analyzed solely in light of whether there has been a temporary drop in crop size or fall in production. The real question is what it has cost Colombia to make significant advances in the war against cocaine production and trade.

Is the current war on drugs policy successful?

I would not say so. In fact, I’d say the opposite, investments made by Colombia and the United States, combined, add to approximately 1.2 to 1.4 billion US dollars invested yearly (or approximately 1.5% of the GDP) and the production between 2000 and 2007 or 2008 has stayed more or less stable. That is to say that while resources have been massively invested, very little has come out of it (in terms of reducing cocaine production). One area where the plan has shown positive results is in improving security in Colombia, thanks to military resources made available by Plan Colombia.

What was the methodology used in your economic analysis of Plan Colombia?

We used game theory, a microeconomic tool that allows you to create models for strategic interactions, to build an economic model of the war against drugs. The mathematical model incorporates various actors involved in the conflict. The most interesting aspect is that we were able to use data available from results of the War against Drugs in Colombia. This allowed us to build various indices of efficiency, cost and effectiveness.

What is your conclusion, is Plan Colombia effective or not?

When it was launched in 2000, Plan Colombia had two main goals: to reduce cocaine crops and production by half by 2006 (that is, in six years) and to improve security in Colombia. The second goal was reached. And although the cocaine crops dropped by half (today they are 81 thousand hectares) as compared with 1999 and 2000 (at 160 thousand hectares), cocaine production nevertheless, stayed the same. That is to say, the same quantities of cocaine are being produced in half the area that was necessary prior to Plan Colombia.

How can that be explained?

Cocaine producers made changes and increased their productivity per hectare, they use plants that are much more resistant with higher concentrations of alkaloids, in smaller cultivation areas, and have seedbeds ready. In conclusion: the demand for cocaine has not fallen, prices have not risen, demand has stayed the same.

What went wrong?

The war waged against cocaine production through Plan Colombia focused on attacking illegal plantations, that is to say, they attacked the weakest link, the lowest rung in the cocaine production, distribution and consumption cycle. What should have been done, is to invest more in cocaine seizures, finding the cocaine labs, and banning the chemicals necessary to produce cocaine, most of the chemicals enter Colombia through its southern borders, especially from Brazil.

In your research you point out that Colombia and the United States prefer to spend Plan Colombia resources differently, how do they differ?

The best strategy for the US is to invest all Plan Colombia resources on blocking cocaine circulation. That is, instead of attacking cultivation and production, to target the distribution routes. For Colombia, on the other hand, attacking cocaine production makes more sense, because its costs Colombia much more per cocaine transfer. Every dollar that a cocaine producer makes costs Colombia 55 cents, while every dollar that a drug trafficker makes, costs Colombia 2 cents. For Colombia, the greater losses are inflicted today by cocaine producers (that is to say, by the guerillas and the paramilitary forces that control crops) not by narcotraffickers, this was a concern that made sense only in the time of Pablo Escobar. On the other hand, the FARC and the paramilitary forces finance themselves mainly through the production of cocaine and the first stages of the drug trade process. For that reason the country prefers to focus on the war against drugs at the level of production.

What would the best strategy be?

It is possible to attack production and the drug trade routes and traffickers when we attack the labs and tackle the influx of the chemical components necessary in the cocaine production process. For example, vast quantities of gasoline are necessary to make cocaine, if we curbed the illegal consumption of gasoline, it would impact the process. This is where Brazil and Ecuador play an important role, a great part of the chemicals necessary to make cocaine come from these countries and that was something that former president of Brazil Fernando Henrique Cardoso recognized in a recent visit to Colombia.

Of course we would have to compare the costs of the war on drugs with the costs of legalizing illicit drug use (involving prevention, and treatment programs for users) to evaluate which of the two is the most efficient model.

What is the most convenient model for producing countries such as Colombia, Peru and Bolivia?

Consuming countries should adopt drug abuse treatment and prevention policies, because by lowering consumption, prices drop and thus it stops attracting people into this line of business. But if countries like the United States direct their entire investments to reducing supply, and do little to stem demand, the result is that prices are pushed up and it ends up favoring those who are involved in the business.

There is only a single solution, to have the countries involved to work through partnerships: Colombia is interested in stemming the money that goes into organized crime, and the US is interested in shutting off the entry of drugs into their territory. In the end, both nations recognize that that they need each other and are interested in cooperating mutually.

Have the shrinkage of cocaine plantations not impacted the quantities of cocaine entering the US?

As far as Colombia’s cocaine production is concerned, it is between 15 and 20% of the total cocaine production, which means approximately 600 thousand kilos. There are large cultivation areas being eradicated but we must ask ourselves, what are 100 kilos compared with the vast quantities produced? The crop eradications do not have great impact and much more could be done by adopting policies to stop the flow of cocaine.

How can the flow of cocaine be stopped?

The same way we combated kidnappings: by investing in intelligence, in interception, in infiltrating networks of narcotraffickers, by seizing chemicals, etc. When an airplane fumigates a hectare of cocaine plantations, it will cost the pockets of the cocaine producer about 400 dollars, but if the police intercept one kilo of cocaine in the Caribbean, it will cost a drug dealer 15 thousand dollars, if the same kilo of cocaine is intercepted at the US border, it may cost the narcotraffickers 35 thousand dollars. There is ample room for action, but you will have much more devastating effects if you attack the drug trade at distribution than when you attack it at the level of production.

Why has the price of cocaine stayed stable despite the war on drugs?

Because the demand for cocaine is equally stable. We are talking about a product that creates addiction, and in face of addiction people show limited reaction to changes in prices. If the price of the substance I am addicted to rises, then I simply look for a way to get the money. Cocaine prices in the long run have had a tremendous drop, especially in the US. In Europe, especially in Spain and Northern Ireland, prices have risen because there has been an increase in demand.

Translated by Lis Horta Moriconi