Managing State Stockpile Facilities: a National and Regional Security Issue

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Two major risks which originate in the inadequate management of state stockpile facilities of arms and ammunition for small arms and light weapons (SALW) make of this issue one of national and regional security: large explosions and misappropriation of arms and ammunition by illegal agents. These risks are crucial in Latin America and the Caribbean, a region afflicted by problems such as insufficient means, corruption, urban violence, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, transnational organized crime and, in Colombia’s case, by an internal armed conflict with transnational ramifications in the areas of arms, ammunition and financial networks, which contribute to finance the activities of the groups involved in the conflict.

An excessive accumulation of theoretically obsolete arms and ammunition, or which exceed the needs of the armed forces and security forces of the States, further increase the risks of explosion or misappropriation. Generally, less attention is paid to what is not in use. Surplus arms and ammunition are stored in stockpiles, where they are supposedly safe. But the risk of misappropriation or explosion increases in direct proportion to the size of the stockpile. The arms and ammunition arsenals safeguarded by security forces or under judicial custody must been seen as a potential source of diversion.

Both the diversion of arms and ammunition and the explosion of a stockpile are national security problems in the sense that they can affect the integrity of the population, the institutions, the territory and the sovereignty of a State. Explosions of ammunition stockpiles can have devastating effects, such as loss of life and of infrastructure, above all when they are located near large urban concentrations of people, which is frequently the case in Latin America and the Caribbean where big cities grow quickly, often in a disorganized, not to mention a chaotic, way. The diversion of SALW and their ammunition, resulting from theft or illegal trade, supplies  criminal organizations and armed groups, which often, have the means to challenge the State authorities and control certain urban and rural areas in the national territory. The embezzlement of SALW and their ammunition also carries a transnational dimension that affects regional security. Arms traffickers ignore borders and exploit the neighboring countries’ vulnerabilities. Any breach in the management of arsenals and stockpiles opens the way for arms and ammunition to be misappropriated and transferred to the neighboring country, to be used there by illegal armed groups and criminal organizations. This possibility is particularly worrisome because, in the case of armed forces and security force arsenals, we are dealing with Salw and ammunition of high destructive power, such as, for example, automatic weapons (assault rifles, machine guns, submachine guns), mortars and shells, portable anti-tank weapons, portable air-defense systems (Manpads) and hand grenades.

The risk of  diversion of Salw and their ammunition has been seriously considered by the States of Latin America and the Caribbean. This appears clearly in the texts of the legally binding regional and international documents ratified by the countries of the region. Among them are the Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms (Cifta, 1997), the Decision 552 of the General Secretariat of the Andean Community (known as the Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects) and the United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components, which complement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.1   The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA), a document of extreme political importance and widely consensual for the region’s countries, includes specific references on the need to guarantee the security of the arsenals and stockpiles, destroy stocks of surplus weapons and assure oneself of the eventual disposal of safeguarded stocks. 2

In order to avoid misappropriations and accidents, it is essential that the responsible authorities be able, at any moment, to locate and identify the SALW and their ammunition according to their type and function at all times. The management of State arsenals and stockpiles is a complex process which involves four activities, substantially linked: the marking of SALW and their ammunition, the existence of an adequate record keeping , the secure safeguarding of stockpiles, and the identification and destruction of surplus.

The good management of arsenals and stockpile facilities  goes well beyond conventions and political declarations. These instruments must be implemented through efficient practices and the adequate training of the personnel responsible for this management. The information exchange on management experiences, at the national level, is fundamental for the identification of efficient methods, which can in turn be assimilated and put to use by other countries of the region. With this in mind, I wish to highlight the importance of the recent “Seminar of European Union - Latin American and Caribbean Experts on the Administration and Security of Small Arms and Light Weapons’ Arsenals, including their Ammunition”, held in San José of Costa Rica on September 6 and 7, organized by the governments of Costa Rica and the Federal Republic of Germany, in which I participated as the main speaker of a panel on the administration  and security of Salw ammunition stockpile facilities.

The seminar was attended by specialists, representatives of governmental agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organization, who spoke of their experiences at the national and regional level, on the following aspects: 3

- The importance of the sound management and security of public arsenals of small arms and light weapons, including their ammunition, and the combat against illegal transfers.
- The administration and security of state arsenals of small arms and light weapons.
- The management of the arsenals and stockpiles and security of the ammunition.
- The identification of the arms and ammunition surpluses; and the ways to evaluate the arms and ammunition that exceed the State’s needs.
- Destruction, recycling and topics related to the environment: the challenges posed by the waste of arms and ammunition surpluses.

During two days, specialists, diplomats, military personnel and members of the security forces of several countries had the chance to exchange their experiences, not only their successes but also the difficulties and the problems faced in implementing the norms and international principles regarding arsenal and stockpile management. I returned home with the impression that arsenal and stockpile management is now a priority in the participating governments’ agenda, not only due to the quality of the information presented but also by the fact that civil servants of governmental agencies were given  the opportunity to talk with their counterparts from other countries. I am also convinced that, through the exchange of information, this type of event contributes to an increased regional security.

1 See Article VIII of Cifta. This convention has been in force since January 7, 1998, and has been ratified by 26 States of Latin America and the Caribbean . See Articles 9 and 11 of the United Nations Firearm Protocol, which complement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. This protocol has been in force since July 3, 2005 and has been ratified by the following countries of Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis as well as São Tomé and Príncipe. See Annex II of Decision 552.
2 See Article 17, 18 and 29 of Chapter II of UNPoA and Articles 6 and 8 of Chapter III of the same document.
3 Representatives of the following countries participated as speakers: Poland (representing the European Union), Costa Rica, Spain, Guatemala, Uruguay, Germany, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. Representatives of the governments of Argentina, Paraguay, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Mexico and Finland participated as observers. The panels also had speakers from the United Nations Regional Center for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-Lirec), from the Programme of European Union Assistance for Curbing Small Arms and light weapons in Cambodia (EU Asac), from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), from the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress, from Viva Rio, and from the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (Bicc).