Tracking the guns: international diversion of small arms to illicit markets in Rio de Janeiro
Pablo Dreyfus (Viva Rio)
Nicholas Marsh (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo-Prio)
Marcelo de Sousa Nascimento (Institute for Religion Studies -Iser)
Executive summary
This report outlines some of the possible means by which foreign made small arms and light weapons were diverted from legal trade into illicit markets in Brazil. It starts with some of the first analysis of the database of illegal weapons seized by the Rio de Janeiro police. The majority of seized weapons were manufactured in Brazil. However, many were also produced abroad. These foreign made weapons offer a unique opportunity to examine possible diversion points because Brazil imposed strict import restrictions on many types of small arms and light weapons. It is therefore possible to discern the most likely purchasers in Brazil (in instances where the restrictions were relaxed) or the neighboring country to which the weapons were first exported to before they were diverted. When licensing arms exports, governments should rigorously assess the risk that the weapons may be diverted into illicit ownership.
This report highlights numerous instances where transfers of weapons to Brazil’s neighbors were the most likely source of the arms seized by the police in Rio de Janeiro.
- Many weapons, including sub-machine guns and assault rifles, were diverted into criminal possession from Brazilian government controlled stockpiles and from private ownership by collectors.
- Lax regulations in Paraguay in particular allowed that country to act as an open door for arms smugglers into illicit markets in Brazil. For years, arms exports from the USA and Western Europe flooded into Paraguay and many were then illicitly diverted into Brazil.
- Lack of control over gun shops, and the sale of weapons, in Venezuela, Argentina and Uruguay also facilitated the diversion of thousands of weapons.
- The overwhelming majority of weapons seized were not previously registered by the police. They were therefore either illicitly trafficked into Brazil from abroad, or were purchased by parties that were not required to register their arms with the police (such as collectors).
These findings naturally promote the following policy recommendations: In importing countries, there needs to be strict control over the sale of arms and measures to ensure that they are only sold to authorized parties that will own them responsibly. Furthermore, in order to prevent diversion, governments need to insist upon strict control over official stockpiles (especially of surplus weapons); and over private holdings of weapons (especially by collectors).
Exporting countries need to thoroughly evaluate the risk of diversion when considering an export license. This should include inter alia: the national laws and regulations of the importing country – particularly those relating to the sale of weapons; control over official stockpiles; and the ability of a country to implement its laws and policies. Most importantly, governments should not look at an export license in isolation. They need to evaluate a license application in the light of recent trade flows of arms in, and out, of the prospective importer. This report indicates that such an analysis is possible.
Conclusion
This report outlines some of the possible means by which foreign made small arms and light weapons were diverted from legal trade and ownership into illicit markets in Brazil and particularly in the State of Rio de Janeiro. It begins by conducting a pioneering analysis of the database of illegal weapons seized by the Rio de Janeiro police. The majority of the weapons seized as recorded in that database were manufactured in Brazil. Many, however, were also produced abroad. Brazil’s strict imports restrictions on many types of small arms and light weapons has therefore made it possible to determine who are the most likely purchasers in Brazil (in instances where the restrictions were relaxed) and identify the neighboring country to which the weapons were first exported, before the weapons were diverted.
When licensing arms exports, governments should rigorously assess the risk that the weapons may be diverted into illicit ownership. This report highlights numerous instances in which weapons transfers to Brazil’s neighbors have been identified as the most likely source of the firearms seized by the police in Rio de Janeiro.
- Many weapons, including sub-machine guns and assault rifles, were diverted into criminal possession from stockpiles under the control of the Brazilian government and from private ownership by collectors.
- Lax regulations in Paraguay in particular allowed that country to act as an open door for arms smugglers into illicit markets in Brazil. For years, arms exports from the USA and Western Europe flowed into Paraguay and many were subsequently illicitly diverted into Brazil. Thanks to unilateral initiatives and cooperation with Brazil, the problem of grey markets in Paraguay is now beginning to be contained. However, lack of adequate controls over gun shops, and the sale of weapons, in other neighboring countries also facilitated the diversion of thousands of weapons.
- The importance of the pool of informal (that is unregistered) small arms in the possession of civilians as a source of domestic and foreign weapons for criminal and armed groups should not be under-estimated. Cheap, low quality revolvers produced and sold in Argentina during times of lax practices and regulations (before 1994) are still being smuggled to Paraguay and seized by the police in Rio de Janeiro. The surplus of non registered or poorly controlled small arms in civilian hands is as serious an issue as is the poorly controlled military weapons surplus. When controls are tightened in a given country, criminals look elsewhere for other potential sources. This report also recommends massive gun collection campaigns as a way of drying up the supply of weapons for criminals. One such campaign was implemented by the Brazilian Government between July 2004 and October 88 2005 that resulted in the hand over of approximately 460,000 weapons.
- The overwhelming majority of weapons seized by the Rio de Janeiro police had no previous records of ownership. These weapons were therefore either illicitly trafficked into Brazil from abroad, purchased and registered in other states and subsequently brought into Rio de Janeiro, or were purchased by parties not required to register their weapons with the police (such as collectors, who, in Brazil, register their weapons with the Army).
- Weapons are diverted in Brazil or its neighbors. There is little or no evidence of weapons whose source was likely to be directly from outside South America. This shows that, at least in the case of Brazil , global trafficking networks are legally transported to the region and then diverted to illicit markets.
These findings naturally promote the following policy recommendations: Importing countries need to enact strict controls over the sale of firearms as well as measures to ensure that firearms are only sold to authorized parties that will own them responsibly. Furthermore, in order to prevent diversion, governments need to insist upon strict control over official stockpiles (especially of surplus weapons); and over private holdings of weapons (especially by collectors). The centralization of information is extremely relevant at the domestic level and allows for international cooperation in tracing weapons and ammunition. Brazil federalized its registration procedures in 2003 and also established mandatory information exchange between the Army and the Federal Police (on-line and through confidentiality protocols).
Information exchange between security agencies makes it possible to rapidly identify and curtail patterns of diversion of weapons held by groups of users controlled by different government institutions.
Exporting countries need to thoroughly evaluate the risk of weapons diversion when considering issuing an export license. This should include inter alia : the national laws and regulations of the importing country – particularly those pertaining to the sale of weapons; control over official stockpiles; and the ability of a nation to implement its laws and policies. Most importantly, governments should not look at an export license in isolation. Governments need to evaluate license applications in light of recent arms trade flowing in and out, of the prospective importer. This report indicates that such an analysis is possible.
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