When it comes to citizen security in Latin America, most states focus only on national security.
Ten years after the Cold War, security still means identifying internal and external enemies that threaten the stability of states. This doctrine has sustained persisting structures and concepts that now must deal with contemporary problems affecting citizen security and quality of life.
Excessive centralization in the hands of the national executive means that the multiple causes of security problems are ignored. Increasingly, the causes and consequences exist and should be treated at the local level. Yet, the local governments in most Central and South American countries are not responsible for security.
It is important to recognize that many crimes have local peculiarities, placing crime prevention in the ambit of city government. International crimes, such as narco-trafficking, the illegal arms trade, human trafficking and car theft, affect the daily lives of citizens. So too does selling and using drugs in small quantities, individual participation in the illegal gun trade, the diffusion of the Mafia culture as expressed by the indiscriminate use of violence to resolve any conflict, in addition to the uprooting and exploitation of immigrant groups who seek a better future in developed countries.
In Colombia, the 1991 National Constitution delegated responsibility for the management of security policy to the governors and mayors, who give orders to the commanders of the National Police. Still, local government is not granted full autonomy in this area, since presidential orders prevail over the orders from the governors, who prevail over the Mayors. Despite this improvement, very few local authorities in Colombia assume this responsibility; the majority still delegate security to the armed forces.
Yet when the mayors assumed leadership, the results were satisfactory, such as was the case of the city of Bogota, where, in the period from 1994 to 2003 the homicide rate was reduced by more than 70%, fatal traffic accidents by 65% and other crimes by more than 35%.
Bogota’s success story
In less than 50 years, Bogota went from being a small city with less than 500,000 inhabitants to a metropolis of more than 7 million inhabitants: uniquely large in Colombia, if not in Latin America. From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, as the population grew, violence increased excessively, jumping from 22 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 1985 to 80 homicides per 100,000 people in 1993.
Faced with unbridled violence, City Hall began a series of measures in 1994, to reduce risk factors and improve security in the city. These measures significantly lowered the homicide rate and brought a rising trend in violent crime down to 22.6 homicides per thousand people in 2004; meaning, it went from 4,352 homicides in 1993 to 1,582 in 2004, as shown by figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Bogotá, Colombia—Rate per 100,000 inhabitants (1985-2004)

Source: Institute for Legal Medicine and Forensic Science 1985-2004. National Attorney General. Colombia.
This achievement is shown by a 70% reduction in homicides in 10 years. Compared to other cities, Bogota now ranks below Caracas, Washington, Rio de Janeiro, Panama City and Mexico City; cities that used to be less violent than Bogota. (See Figure 2).
Figure 2: Homicide Rates in Cities in the Americas (2004)

Source: Revista América Economía 2004 and 2003. Institute for Legal Medicine and Forensic Science. Colomia. 2004.
While Bogota successfully reduced homicides, other Colombian cities saw considerable increases in the homicide rate, especially due to the armed conflict and drug trafficking in the late-1990s.
Reducing fatal traffic accidents was another important step. They were reduced from 1,387 deaths in 1995 to 598 in 2003. This is a change from 25 fatal traffic accidents per 100,000 inhabitants in 1995 to 8,7 as you can see in figure 3.
Figure 3: Deaths Caused by Traffic Accidents (1991-2003)
Bogota, Colombia

Source: Institute for Legal Medicine and Forensic Science. Colombia
The city also reduced other crimes. Between 1998 and 2004 crime was down by 35%, from 35,000 reports to a few more than 22,000 incidents.
The institutionalization of citizen security management and the progressive definition of a public policy led to these results. Mayors Antanas Mockus S. (1995-1997), Enrique Peñalosa L. (1998-2000) and Antanas Mockus S. (2001-2003) took on this topic directly, working with the Federal Police and the other offices in the City Hall. The most noteworthy characteristics in Bogota’s transformation were:
-Institutional Management by the highest political authorities: even though various security, judicial and administrative authorities are responsible for security, Bogota City Hall, based on the National Constitution, assumed leadership and coordination for the city’s citizen security policy. They made protecting life and implementing innovative projects to improve coexistence, citizen security and inter-institutional coordination the top priorities.
- Reliable Information: without detailed information on violence and crime it is difficult to analyze, make decisions and evaluate actions that take on security problems. So the Unified Information System on Violence and Crime (SUIVD) was designed and implemented with information from the Metropolitan Police and the National Institute for Forensic Medicine at the Attorney General’s office.
-The Plan for Security and Coexistence: as of 1995, a security and a peaceful coexistence plan was designed and implemented with projects and resources destined to strengthen the Federal Police and judiciary and prevent violence and crime. Without ignoring punishment and judicial action, the plan was oriented towards strengthening citizenship and peacefully resolving domestic, interpersonal and community conflicts. The emphasis was on reducing risks (controlling alcohol consumption, closing bars at 1 a.m., restrictions to bearing legal and illegal weapons, taking back public spaces and deteriorated urban areas) and caring for the most vulnerable sectors of society (homeless, youths, families displaced by the violence and prostitutes).
- Creating Administrative Infrastructure: designating human resources, experts and finances to manage and direct citizen security and coexistence, starting with the punitive and preventive means. In 1997, a sub-secretariat for citizen security and coexistence was created under the Secretariat of Government that has always counted on specialized administrative personnel to lead projects, programs and resources that both strengthen governmental and non-governmental security and justice programs, as well as projects to improve citizen coexistence.
-Accountability, Evaluation and Follow-up: these processes were based on the analyses of information from the Unified Information System on Violence and Crime (SUIVD), as well as research and periodic inter-agency meetings. At least once a month the District Security Council, overseen by the town hall with the participation of the commander of the Federal Police, the Section Chief, the vice-Attorney General of the nation and other security and justice authorities evaluated the results of the security policy. Beside the District Council, ten local security councils function in the city (one in each district in the city).
-Outside Evaluation: The private sector, through the program, “How’s Bogota Going” (“Bogotá como vamos”), with the Bogota Chamber of Commerce, the leading newspaper, El Tiempo, and a well-known NGO followed and verified the results of the Security Plan while researching victimization and perception of security. Over the last few years, the research shows that citizens feel more secure in the city and possess more confidence in the authorities, especially the Metropolitan Police.
- Citizen Participation and Training in Security and Coexistence: under the notion that other citizens are part of the solution to coexistence and citizen security, the District Administration and police started in 1995 to organize training for community leaders about coexistence and citizen security in the neighborhoods and communities.
Hugo Acero Velásquez is the ex-sub-secretary of Security for Bogotá. Become a member of Comunidad Segura. Enter your user name and password to see the author’s complete profile by clicking on the article’s byline.
Translated by Catherine Griffith
Read the complete text of the article in PDF format (In Portuguese)








Comments
No one is more irritated by
No one is more irritated by a high car insurance bill than a safe
driver. You drive the speed limit, always obey traffic rules and have
never been in an accident, but you still have to look that big bill in
the face every month. Even the best drivers can find ways to save even
more on their car insurance, on top of discounts for being a good
driver.form a captive
Post new comment