Latin America’s Involvement in UN Peace Operations

Latin America’s involvement in UN Peace Operations Since the early 1990s, the number of UN-led peace operations has at times nearly doubled, and their mandates have expanded considerably, creating a significant challenge for the international community.¹ Since then, and especially in the last decade, Latin America has been recognized as the region that has responded the most to the challenge. As military involvement in UN missions nearly tripled (from 30,446 to 86,231) from 2000 to 2010, the participation of Latin American military saw a ten-fold increase (from 753 to 7,523).

Latin America’s Preference to Work in the region

When LA governments send military or police to UN missions, their preference is undeniable: for geopolitical reasons, they prefer the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Despite the differences in language, history and culture between Haiti and most LA countries, the numbers demonstrate a strong commitment by the region to the region: from the 7,246 LA troops currently deployed in UN missions around the world, 5,343 are in MINUSTAH, corresponding to 73.7% of LA’s total troop contribution.

In MINUSTAH, LA military have a prominent position: of the 8,743 troops deployed with the mission, 5,343 come from Latin America. This is more than 61%. Among them, four countries from South America can be said to demonstrate a special engagement: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, known as “ABC-U.” Their contribution represents 85.1% of LA’s total troop contribution in MINUSTAH (or 4,549 of 5,343 troops).

The relevance of MINUSTAH to LA countries is also illustrated by the deployment of police. As a rule, most LA governments do not include the deployment of individual police or Formed Police Units (FPU) as part of their foreign policy. Some reasons may include domestic issues with public security, lack of political will and lack of support from the public, to mention a few. As a result, among the 13,648 police officers from all nationalities who are currently deployed in 16 UN peace operations under the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),4 only 163 are from LA. This corresponds to 1.2% of the total number of police deployed in UN missions. Despite the small number, it is relevant to note that there is a clear preference for MINUSTAH by Latin American police-contributing countries: more than half of police officers from LA working in UN missions are in MINUSTAH (87 individuals, or 53.4%).

MINUSTAH has a police component of representatives from 49 countries, including seven countries from Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Uruguay. The mission’s police component consists of 2,825 professionals as individual police and FPUs, to which LA countries contribute with 3.1%, the 87 police officers mentioned above. The remaining 96.9% of MINUSTAH’s police component is represented by Jordan, 364 (12.9% of the total); Bangladesh, 327 (11.6%); Pakistan, 304 (10.8%); Indonesia, 299 (10.6%); Nepal, 199 (7.0%); Italy, 126 (4.5%); Canada, 103 (3.6%); and other countries, whose contributions equal 1,016 (39.0%).

These numbers highlight the disparity between the strategic importance of MINUSTAH for Latin American countries and their allocation of UN police to the mission. As a result, it seems that there is a clear window of opportunity for LA countries to increase their contribution to MINUSTAH and for Brazil in particular.

Brazil’s engagement in UN Peace Operations

Since the very beginning of MINUSTAH (June 2004), until the post-earthquake recovery and reconstruction (2010), Brazil has had the largest contingent of troops, as well as the political leadership and the command of the mission. Also, this is the first time in UN history that all force commanders of a mission are of one single nationality, Brazilian.The question arises: how did this come about?

Historically, Brazil has taken part in peacekeeping missions since the first time the UN decided to send observers and troops to the territory of other countries, in 1948 and 1956, respectively. Brazilian battalions were deployed to the missions in Suez, Angola, Mozambique, Timor Leste and Haiti. Both the first and the current missions set precedents for Brazil: in its experience in Suez, Brazil sustained its longest participation in any UN mission (10 years), and in MINUSTAH (2004–present), Brazil has surpassed its own record in terms of numbers of military ever deployed.

Throughout 60 years of UN missions, Brazil has been a regular contributor, but 2004 saw a major increase in Brazilian engagement in peace operations. In fact, when the crisis in Haiti erupted and the international community decided to react to it, three main factors seemed to push Brazil towards the expansion of its own peacekeeping policy. First, in the domestic arena, President Lula’s fi rst electoral mandate was in its second year. Second, in a foreign policy context, on January 1, 2004, Brazil had become a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, elected on October 23, 2003, and was seeking a permanent seat in that body. Third, in a geopolitical dimension, there was a clear lack of political will from the United States to participate in a third armed conflict, parallel to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, powers with historical and cultural ties with Haiti, such as France or Canada, lacked direct interest in engaging or commanding a mission in the Caribbean.

The combination of these three factors may have provided the opportunity for Brazil not only to take the political leadership of the new mission, but also to provide amplified military participation, with the largest contingent of MINUSTAH. For the first time, Brazil accepted the risk to lead and command a mission which, by then, had a high probability of failing—a very different position from its engagement in previous missions.

Another major turning point in Brazil’s engagement in UN peace operations occurred in 2010. After the earthquake in Haiti on January 12, 2010, the Brazilian government sent a second battalion to MINUSTAH. It began arriving on February 9, 2010, elevating the number of Brazilian troops to 2,216, thus doubling the total number of Brazilian military personnel in Haiti.

On the military police side, or the “Brazilian Gendarmerie,” in the last 10 years Brazil has deployed a limited number of individual police, never exceeding 19. This was different during the 1990s, when Brazil contributed to UN missions with 39 police and more, deployed to the missions in Angola (UNAVEM II and III, and MONUA) and in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), for example. As of August 2010, there are four military police in MINUSTAH (Haiti), two in UNMIS (southern Sudan) and six in UNMIT (Timor Leste). These numbers do not seem significant for a regional power. Brazil often receives several requests from the DPKO to increase the number of police—especially in MINUSTAH, where it was asked to provide 29 police officers in both 2009 and 2010—but was not able to deliver, mainly due to a shortage of police officers who speak a second language and who are available to stay one year in an international mission.

The good news is that in September 2010 the Brazilian government made a significant effort to expand its police contingent. There is now a total of 31 Brazilian police officers working in UN missions. The Brazilian police contingent in UNMIT has increased from 6 to 20, but the numbers of police officers remain the same for UNMIS and MINUSTAH.

Hence, 2010 witnessed the largest number of Brazilian military ever deployed (2,224 professionals), and it also indicates the return to the patterns of the 1990s in terms of its police deployment (31 professionals). The growth of Brazil’s engagement between 2000 and 2010 can be seen in the graphic below. Statistics demonstrate a clear increase in 2010; however, it remains to be seen how long this level can be sustained.

Brazil is definitely moving forward, but the leading LA contributors of troops and police to UN missions are Uruguay (2,552 military) and El Salvador (49 police officers), respectively. In fact, there are several obstacles for an expanded and sustained engagement by the Brazilian military and police. First, there are operational limits, such as budget and logistics. Second, there are legal obstacles, such as one that prevents the deployment of police institutions other than the Brazilian Gendarmerie.

A third obstacle would be related to language, since proficiency in English is mandatory for both police and military officers in most UN missions, and it seems that skills in a foreign language other than Spanish are not yet a priority for most Brazilians. A final obstacle is political/cultural: some officers in the gendarmerie and some sectors of the society who suggest that there are enough security problems in Brazilian urban areas, and that human and financial resources should not be spent in foreign lands.

Conclusion

This paper aimed to demonstrate that, throughout the last decade, Latin America changed its pattern of engagement in UN peace operations. Brazil is making impressive investments in its deployment capacity (impressive, that is, compared with its previous record), with a clear increase in 2004 and again in 2010. To fulfill its potential, Brazil will have to overcome some barriers in institutional and legal frameworks, as well as in the cultural dynamics of its society.

However, 2010 has definitely shown Brazil’s political will to perform a role not only as a regional power but also as a key contributor to peace operations.

Photos United Nations Stabilization Mission In Haiti: General Luiz Eduardo Ramos Pereira, Force Commander; Brasilian Peacekeepers on foot patrol at Cite du Soleil; Brazilian UN doctor provides medical care to a child (Marco Dormino)